# Resolved: The United States ought to end its use of secondary sanctions on other countries

# Introduction

Economic sanctions are a very old diplomatic practice, but their use by the US is relatively recent. After WWII, the US found itself in the position of a global superpower. This turned the US into an essential trading partner, which bolstered the power of its sanctions significantly. A sanctioned country can suffer from economic harms ranging from recessions to complete collapse. Initially the US limited itself to levying primary sanctions, which prevent US entities from doing business with sanctioned countries. Secondary sanctions, which this resolution asks us to consider, target non-US businesses which work inside and with targeted countries. For example, a primary sanction on Iran might make it unlawful for the Bank of America to do business there, whereas a secondary sanction might threaten a German bank with limiting its access to the US if it does business with Iran. In a nutshell, primary sanctions punish local entities for doing business with sanctioned entities, and secondary sanctions punish foreign entities for doing business with sanctioned entities.

The US is currently sanctioning over 20 countries, which together contain more than a quarter of the world’s population. Some are unilateral, while others are part of multilateral sanction agreements with other sanctioning countries. The reasons are varied, but the US State Department usually cites human rights violations or terrorism as its reason for levying sanctions.

The affirmative strategy in this brief asks the judge to consider the human cost of secondary sanctions and consider whether the lives directly affected by sanctions are worth the strategic benefits gained. To extend this strategy, look for cards which demonstrate the material harms caused by secondary sanctions on a human level, and cards which show sanctions as being an ineffective diplomatic tool.

An alternative affirmative strategy might focus on pointing out the more specific differences between primary and secondary sanctions and finding offense there. Perhaps you could argue that secondary sanctions are, in practice, tiny and ineffective. Widening the scope of a secondary sanction is often impossible to do without harming one’s allies, but making them any smaller would make the sanction even more useless. They are no more than an empty gesture of disapproval which only serves to increase aggression between countries, without sufficiently removing the capacity for the sanctioned country to fight back.

The negative strategy here takes the position that international conflict is an inevitable consequence of our global world order (see “political realism” for more information on that perspective), and that non-militaristic strategies for expressing frustration should be treated as useful deterrents for direct military action. Secondary sanctions, then, have the benefit of being an effective method pressuring foreign leaders while also being another buffer between a dispute and a war.

An alternative negative strategy could take a more Kantian approach and claim that it is a moral imperative to harm companies giving money and business to countries doing immoral things (i.e. actively flouting human rights). It may not always turn out perfectly, but that’s an issue with the sanction’s execution, so it doesn’t problematize the moral worth of sanctioning itself. Ignoring these abuses enables dictators and reinforces a lack of regard for human life.

# Further Reading

<https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en-us/knowledge/publications/5522bd68/overview-of-us-sanctions-laws-and-regulations>

<https://mepc.org/eu-sanctions-iran-european-political-context>

<https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/SecondarySanctions_Final.pdf>

<https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/10/29/maximum-pressure/us-economic-sanctions-harm-iranians-right-health>

<https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/economic-sanctions/>

<https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2015/07/10/political-and-psychological-challenges-to-sanctions-relief/>

<https://web.stanford.edu/class/ips216/Readings/pape_97%20(jstor).pdf>

<https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/when-do-economic-sanctions-work-best>

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/04/28/13-times-that-economic-sanctions-really-worked/>

https://www.investopedia.com/financial-edge/0410/countries-sanctioned-by-the-u.s.---and-why.aspx

# Affirmative

## AC

### Definitions

#### Secondary Sanctions

Moehr 18

Ole Moehr (Ole Moehr serves as an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Global Business & Economics Program), The Atlantic Council, "Secondary Sanctions: A First Glance - Atlantic Council", Feb 6, 2018, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/econographics/ole-moehr-3/> -CD

Primary sanctions, such as asset freezes and trade embargoes, prohibit citizens and companies of the sanctioning country from engaging in certain activities with their counterparts from the sanctioned country. For example, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the US government, prohibited, among other things, new investment in Crimea by US persons. Secondary sanctions put pressure on third parties to stop their activities with the sanctioned country by threatening to cut-off the third party’s access to the sanctioning country. Recent US sanctions against Iran illustrate this example well. With the ultimate goal to stop Iran’s nuclear program, US secondary sanctions gave financial institutions around the world a choice to either halt transactions with Iranian banks or lose access to the US financial system. Combined with additional secondary sanctions targeting Iran’s energy sector and broad multilateral support, these financial sanctions succeeded in bringing Iran to the negotiating table.

### Framework

#### Value: Human Rights

United Nations, Updated 2020

United Nations, "Human Rights ", No Date, Updated 7/1/20, https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/human-rights/ -CD

Human rights are rights inherent to all human beings, regardless of race, sex, nationality, ethnicity, language, religion, or any other status. Human rights include the right to life and liberty, freedom from slavery and torture, freedom of opinion and expression, the right to work and education, and many more. Everyone is entitled to these rights, without discrimination.

#### Criterion: Consequentialism

Sinnott-Armstrong 19

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, "Consequentialism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2019), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/consequentialism -CD

Consequentialism, as its name suggests, is simply the view that normative properties depend only on consequences. This historically important and still popular theory embodies the basic intuition that what is best or right is whatever makes the world best in the future, because we cannot change the past, so worrying about the past is no more useful than crying over spilled milk. This general approach can be applied at different levels to different normative properties of different kinds of things, but the most prominent example is probably consequentialism about the moral rightness of acts, which holds that whether an act is morally right depends only on the consequences of that act or of something related to that act, such as the motive behind the act or a general rule requiring acts of the same kind.

#### Thesis: The consequences of US secondary sanctions have been the deprivation of human rights of citizens in various countries around the world. In light of this, ending secondary sanctions is a moral imperative for those who wish to uphold the basic principle of human rights.

### Contention 1: Secondary sanctions create humanitarian crises

#### Secondary sanctions have prevented Iranians from accessing critical medical care and humanitarian aid

HRW 18

Human Rights Watch (an international non-governmental organization, headquartered in New York City, that conducts research and advocacy on human rights), "US Economic Sanctions Harm Iranians’ Right to Health", 10/29/19, https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/10/29/maximum-pressure/us-economic-sanctions-harm-iranians-right-health -CD

In May 2018, the Trump administration formally withdrew from the international nuclear agreement with Iran, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), agreed upon by the Obama administration in July 2015. Over the next 120 days, until November 5, 2018, the US government re-imposed all economic sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear program that had been previously lifted, including “secondary sanctions” on non-US entities that conduct financial or commercial transactions with Iran. Though the US government has built exemptions for humanitarian imports into its sanction regime, broad US sanctions against Iranian banks, coupled with aggressive rhetoric from US officials, have drastically constrained Iran’s ability to finance such humanitarian imports. The consequences of redoubled US sanctions, whether intentional or not, pose a serious threat to Iranians’ right to health and access to essential medicines—and has almost certainly contributed to documented shortages—ranging from a lack of critical drugs for epilepsy patients to limited chemotherapy medications for Iranians with cancer. At the core of the harmful knock-on effects of renewed US sanctions on Iran is that in practice, these sanctions have largely deterred international banks and firms from participating in commercial or financial transactions with Iran, including for exempted humanitarian transactions, due to the fear of triggering US secondary sanctions on themselves. As a result, Iranians’ access to essential medicine and their right to health is being negatively impacted, and may well worsen if the situation remains unchanged, thereby threatening the health of millions of Iranians.

#### Iranians are unnecessarily suffering as treatable conditions go untreated and access to adequate medical care dwindles

HRW 18

Human Rights Watch (an international non-governmental organization, headquartered in New York City, that conducts research and advocacy on human rights), "US Economic Sanctions Harm Iranians’ Right to Health | HRW", 10/29/19, https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/10/29/maximum-pressure/us-economic-sanctions-harm-iranians-right-health -CD

Human Rights Watch found that current economic sanctions, despite the humanitarian exemptions, are causing unnecessary suffering to Iranian citizens afflicted with a range of diseases and medical conditions. Some of the worst-affected are Iranians with rare diseases and/or conditions that require specialized treatment who are unable to acquire previously available medicines or supplies. This includes people with leukemia, epidermolysis bullosa (EB, a type of disease that causes fragile, blistering skin), or epilepsy, and individuals with chronic eye injuries from exposure to chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq war. The consequences for these individuals can be catastrophic: people with severe forms of EB are now unable to access specialized bandages and are at significantly increased risk for bacterial infections, sepsis, fusion of fingers, and contractures of joints. Individuals with epilepsy who are resistant to common treatments and unable to access foreign-made medicines may suffer frequent, uncontrolled seizures that risk injury and result over time in severe, permanent brain damage. Shortages of essential medicines can affect a much broader range of patients as well. For example, an Iranian journalist has reported on severe complications after a Caesarean section believed to be related to the use of a “non-standard” anesthesia medicine because of lack of access to higher quality medication. The abusive consequences of secondary sanctions, demonstrated by research conducted by Siamak Namazi, an Iranian-American analyst, on the sanctions regime during the Obama Administration prior to the JCPOA, have inevitably recurred with the re-imposition of sanctions by the Trump administration. But the difference now with the Trump Administration’s Iran sanctions is “that the US has re-imposed the sanctions it lifted pursuant to the nuclear deal and it has layered on many more, including doing things like designating some Iranian financial institutions not previously designated and that were previously used to facilitate food, medicine and medical imports,” Elizabeth Rosenberg, a former US Treasury Department sanctions official, told NPR. As Rosenberg pointed out, “most of the big Iranian banks are designated” – i.e., under sanction – and smaller banks “may have less capacity to handle cross-border financial transactions.” Iran is currently able to conduct business through a very limited number of banks and financial institutions closely affiliated with countries that had initially received waivers from the US to continue purchasing Iran’s oil, notably China, India and Turkey. These banks used Iran’s oil revenues, held in escrow accounts, to execute financial transactions for imports of medicine and other items prioritized by the Iranian government as essential goods.

#### Even targeted, limited secondary sanctions have catastrophic impacts on the day to day lives of individual citizens, as can be seen in Iran, Venezuela, Cuba, and Iraq

Benjamin & Davies 19

Medea Benjamin (Medea Benjamin is a co-founder of CODEPINK and the fair trade advocacy group Global Exchange), Nicolas J.S. Davies (Nicolas J. S. Davies is an independent journalist, a researcher with CODEPINK, and the author of Blood On Our Hands: The American Invasion and Destruction of Iraq), Truthout, "US Sanctions Are Deadly, Illegal and Ineffective", 6/18/19, <https://truthout.org/articles/us-sanctions-are-deadly-illegal-and-ineffective/> -CD

The U.S. sanctions against Iran are particularly brutal. While they have utterly failed to advance U.S. regime change goals, they have provoked growing tensions with U.S. trading partners across the world and inflicted terrible pain on the ordinary people of Iran. Although food and medicines are technically exempt from sanctions, U.S. sanctions against Iranian banks like Parsian Bank, Iran’s largest non-state-owned bank, make it nearly impossible to process payments for imported goods, and that includes food and medicine. The resulting shortage of medicines is sure to cause thousands of preventable deaths in Iran, and the victims will be ordinary working people, not Ayatollahs or government ministers. U.S. corporate media have been complicit in the pretense that U.S. sanctions are a non-violent tool to inflict pressure on targeted governments in order to force some kind of democratic regime change. U.S. reports rarely mention their deadly impact on ordinary people, instead blaming the resulting economic crises solely on the governments being targeted. The deadly impact of sanctions is all too clear in Venezuela, where economic sanctions have decimated an economy already reeling from the drop in oil prices, opposition sabotage, corruption and bad government policies. A joint annual report on mortality in Venezuela in 2018 by three Venezuelan universities found that U.S. sanctions were largely responsible for at least 40,000 additional deaths that year. The Venezuela Pharmaceutical Association reported an 85% shortage of essential medicines in 2018. Absent U.S. sanctions, the rebound in global oil prices in 2018 should have led to at least a small rebound in Venezuela’s economy and more adequate imports of food and medicine. Instead, U.S. financial sanctions prevented Venezuela from rolling over its debts and deprived the oil industry of cash for parts, repairs and new investment, leading to an even more dramatic fall in oil production than in the previous years of low oil prices and economic depression. The oil industry provides 95% of Venezuela’s foreign earnings, so by strangling its oil industry and cutting Venezuela off from international borrowing, the sanctions have predictably — and intentionally — trapped the people of Venezuela in a deadly economic downward spiral. A study by Jeffrey Sachs and Mark Weisbrot for the Center for Economic and Policy Research, titled “Sanctions as Collective Punishment: the Case of Venezuela,” reported that the combined effect of the 2017 and 2019 U.S. sanctions are projected to lead to an astounding 37.4% decline in Venezuela’s real GDP in 2019, on the heels of a 16.7% decline in 2018 and the over 60% drop in oil prices between 2012 and 2016. In North Korea, many decades of sanctions, coupled with extended periods of drought, have left millions of the nation’s 25 million people malnourished and impoverished. Rural areas in particular lack medicine and clean water. Even more stringent sanctions imposed in 2018 banned most of the country’s exports, reducing the government’s ability to pay for imported food to alleviate the shortages. The harmful effect of US sanctions on Iranians’ access to food and medicine should not be a surprise in light of similar effects observed in other sanctions regimes. The multilateral sanctions on Iraq in the 1990s, for example, notoriously decimated the Iraqi economy and “had a detrimental effect on the health of the population,” according to several health researchers.

#### Sanctions directly contribute to the deaths of millions

Smith 20

Lauren Smith, LAProgressive, "United States Imposed Economic Sanctions: The Big Heist - LA Progressive", 4/16/20, https://www.laprogressive.com/economic-sanctions/ -CD

As applied, economic sanctions function as undeclared war by creating severe economic disruption and hyperinflation in many countries—effects that can be illustrated by the grave economic upheavals experienced by Venezuela, Iraq, Iran, and Cuba. In Cuba’s 2019 report, it is explained that the U.S. economic blockade has deprived it of $922.6 billion (adjusted for inflation) over nearly six decades. Further, because economic sanctions interfere with the functioning of essential infrastructure i.e. electrical grids, water treatment and distribution facilities, transportation hubs, and communication networks by blocking access to key industrial inputs, such as fuel, raw materials, and replacement parts, they lead to droughts, famines, disease, and abject poverty, which results in the death of millions.

### Contention 2: Secondary sanctions fail to achieve strategic goals

#### **Sanctions empirically fail most of the time**

Benjamin & Davies 19

Medea Benjamin (Medea Benjamin is a co-founder of CODEPINK and the fair trade advocacy group Global Exchange), Nicolas J.S. Davies (Nicolas J. S. Davies is an independent journalist, a researcher with CODEPINK, and the author of Blood On Our Hands: The American Invasion and Destruction of Iraq), Truthout, "US Sanctions Are Deadly, Illegal and Ineffective", 6/18/19, https://truthout.org/articles/us-sanctions-are-deadly-illegal-and-ineffective/ -CD

There is one more critical reason for sparing the people of Iran, Venezuela and other targeted countries from the deadly and illegal impacts of U.S. economic sanctions: they don’t work. Twenty years ago, as economic sanctions slashed Iraq’s GDP by 48% over 5 years and serious studies documented their genocidal human cost, they still failed to remove the government of Saddam Hussein from power. Two UN Assistant Secretaries General, Denis Halliday and Hans Von Sponeck, resigned in protest from senior positions at the UN rather than enforce these murderous sanctions. In 1997, Robert Pape, then a professor at Dartmouth College, tried to resolve the most basic questions about the use of economic sanctions to achieve political change in other countries by collecting and analyzing the historical data on 115 cases where this was tried between 1914 and 1990. In his study, titled “Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work,” he concluded that sanctions had only been successful in 5 out of 115 cases. Pape also posed an important and provocative question: “If economic sanctions are rarely effective, why do states keep using them?” He suggested three possible answers: “Decision makers who impose sanctions systematically overestimate the prospects of coercive success of sanctions.” “Leaders contemplating ultimate resort to force often expect that imposing sanctions first will enhance the credibility of subsequent military threats.” “Imposing sanctions usually yields leaders greater domestic political benefits than does refusing calls for sanctions or resorting to force.” We think that the answer is probably a combination of “all of the above.” But we firmly believe that no combination of these or any other rationale can ever justify the genocidal human cost of economic sanctions in Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Venezuela or anywhere else.

#### Sanctions backfire, reinforcing government control and increasing anti-US sentiment

Smith & Garcia 18

Stacey Vanek Smith (Stacey Vanek Smith is the co-host of NPR's The Indicator from Planet Money. She's also a correspondent for Planet Money, where she covers business and economics.), Cardiff Garcia (Cardiff Garcia is a co-host of NPR's The Indicator from Planet Money podcast, along with Stacey Vanek Smith. He joined NPR in November 2017), NPR, "Examining The Impact Of U.S. Sanctions Against Other Countries : NPR", 12/14/18, https://www.npr.org/2018/12/14/676652881/looking-at-the-impact-of-u-s-sanctions-against-other-countries -CD

GARCIA: But there's another downside, one that's a lot more human. Branko Milanovic is an economist at the City University of New York, and he specializes in inequality. BRANKO MILANOVIC: Blanket sanctions, I think, actually, are fundamentally wrong. They punish people who, actually, don't have any influence or very small influence on what the government does. GARCIA: Branko worries that something similar will happen in Iran, where people were already protesting a lack of drinking water and problems affording basic food staples. VANEK SMITH: Of course, there's also this idea that sanctions will make conditions in a country really bad and cause the population to revolt and overthrow the leadership. But that can backfire, says Branko. MILANOVIC: They have the opposite effect of people have greater solidarity with the government because they're - everybody is being affected by them. VANEK SMITH: Ultimately, Dan [Drezner, a professor of international politics at the Tufts University School of Law and Diplomacy] says, the best kind of sanction - the most effective kind of sanction - is often the sanction that never actually happens.

### Contention 3: Secondary sanctions harm our allies and our relationships with them

#### US secondary sanctions harm European commerce and encourage Europe to insulate their economies from the US

Geranmayeh & Rapnouil 19

Ellie Geranmayeh (Ellie Geranmayeh is a senior policy fellow and deputy head of the Middle East and North Africa programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations. She specializes in European foreign policy in relation to Iran, particularly on the nuclear and regional dossiers and sanctions policy), Manuel Lafont Rapnouil (Manuel Lafont Rapnouil was a senior policy fellow and head of the Paris office of the European Council on Foreign Relations until June 2019. His topics of focus include defence and security affairs, French foreign policy, the UN, and the Middle East and North Africa), European Council on Foreign Relations, "Meeting the challenge of secondary sanctions", 6/25/19, https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/meeting\_the\_challenge\_of\_secondary\_sanctions -CD

Secondary sanctions have become a critical challenge for Europe, due to the Trump administration’s maximalist policy on Iran and its aggressive economic statecraft. Europe’s vulnerabilities mostly result from asymmetric interdependence with the US economy, due to the size of US markets and the global role of the US dollar. In [the] future, states will likely weaponise economic interdependence with the EU to target countries that are more important to the European economy than Iran, such as China and Russia. European countries should demonstrate that, despite their economic interdependence with the US, they control EU foreign policy. The EU and its member states should strengthen their sanctions policy, begin to build up their deterrence and resilience against secondary sanctions, and prepare to adopt asymmetric countermeasures against any country that harms European interests through secondary sanctions. They should also attempt to bolster the global role of the euro and lead a robust international dialogue on the role of sanctions. Europe’s exposure to US secondary sanctions is a major foreign policy challenge for which there is no easy solution. The Trump administration’s withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and imposition of such sanctions have harmed European countries’ interests in nuclear non-proliferation and laid bare their limited ability to implement an independent strategy on Iran. Although Europe and the United States continue to closely coordinate their sanctions policies in other situations, disagreements between them – such as on the JCPOA – have led to not only a sharp divergence in their approaches to sanctions but also a clash between their respective foreign policies. Indeed, last summer, European capitals were reminded of the harsh reality that, through secondary sanctions, Washington can use access to the US markets as a source of immense political power. As the US is one of Europe’s largest trade and financial partners, it is hard to find any European business that does not have direct or indirect exposure to these markets and systems. Given its extensive power to investigate and fine European actors – and to cut them off from the US market – the US Treasury’s influence prevails when US and EU regulations and foreign policy diverge. As such, the mere threat of US secondary sanctions on European entities has led to an exodus of EU companies from Iran and undercut a nuclear deal that once stood as a signal achievement of European foreign policy.

#### US economic power will sharply drop in the face of impending distancing efforts by our allies over secondary sanctions

Rappeport & Rogers 19

Alan Rappeport (Alan Rappeport is an economic policy reporter at The New York Times), Katie Rogers (Katie Rogers is a White House correspondent for The New York Times. She started at The Times in 2014 and has since focused on features and breaking news), NYT, "Trump’s Embrace of Sanctions Irks Allies and Prompts Efforts to Evade Measures - The New York Times", 11/15/19, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/15/us/politics/trump-iran-sanctions.html -CD

President Trump’s increasing reliance on economic sanctions to solve foreign policy problems is fueling concern that the United States is abusing its financial power and prompting some governments to seek ways to evade American measures. In recent months, the United States has increased pressure on Iran and Venezuela, dangled the removal of North Korean sanctions and, in only a few days, imposed, then reversed, sanctions against Turkey. Now, American allies and adversaries alike are stepping up efforts to protect themselves in ways that could, over time, erode American power by undermining a key national security tool and diminishing the world’s reliance on the dollar as the global reserve currency. In October, Turkey and Russia agreed to a new system for international transactions that would use their local currencies instead of the dollar, which President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia said in October is being employed by the Trump administration as a “political weapon.” Russia has been holding similar talks with Iran and China about an alternative system that, according to Russian state media, could allow the countries to engage in transactions while evading the arm of United States sanctions. And the European Union moved ahead this year with developing an alternative system that would allow countries to bypass the existing infrastructure for international financial transactions.

## AC Blocks/Extensions

#### Secondary sanctions have been applied to Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela

Control Risk 19

Control Risk (specialist risk consultancy that helps to create secure, compliant and resilient organisations in an age of ever-changing risk.), "Navigating the global sanctions landscape in 2020", Oct 2019, https://ml.globenewswire.com/Resource/Download/c0114454-5fbc-4870-ae83-936b64328d83 -CD

Primary sanctions are restrictions applied to US persons, while secondary sanctions apply to non-US persons and are designed to prevent non-US persons from doing business with a target of primary US sanctions. They have mainly been used in connection to Iran, North Korea and most recently Venezuela. There is very limited precedent for the enforcement of secondary sanctions. However, the prospective penalties that secondary sanctions could impose on non-US organisations is often enough to encourage compliance with them.

#### Targeted secondary sanctions have broad, perceptual impacts on other entities, resulting in far more damage done than intended

Georgi, Alberda, Hassoun 20  
Kay C Georgi (Kay leads the International Trade group and has more than 30 years' experience advising clients on all aspects of international trade, with particular capability in the areas of export control and sanctions, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), and import matters.), Regan K Alberda (Counsel Regan practices in the areas of export controls, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act compliance, corporate ethics, and internal investigations), Marwa M Hassoun (Partner at Arent Fox, Marwa helps clients comply with export and import regulations), Arent Fox LLP, "Reforming US secondary sanctions: what is wrong that can be righted? - Lexology", 7/26/20, https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=cb40397f-66f9-4ce1-8e37-353e11d51f16 -CD

Being placed on the SDN list is not merely a question of doing business with Iran or the United States. Indeed, an entity on the SDN list will have problems doing business in its own country due to the risk-averse positions taken by banks and other companies, which have only been exacerbated by the risk of secondary sanctions. For example, one company was almost bankrupt by the time it was removed from the SDN list, and that company had minimal US business.

HRW 18

Human Rights Watch (an international non-governmental organization, headquartered in New York City, that conducts research and advocacy on human rights), "US Economic Sanctions Harm Iranians’ Right to Health | HRW", 10/29/19, https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/10/29/maximum-pressure/us-economic-sanctions-harm-iranians-right-health -CD

Moreover, the tone of US government officials in public and private concerning economic transactions with Iranian institutions has contributed to companies and banks’ hesitation to engage in trade with Iran. For instance, Richard Grenell, the US Ambassador to Germany, told a German paper on May 6, 2019 that, “You can do as much business as you want in Iran, but we have a say with regards to your visa.” “Because if you do something, we’re not going to agree to let you enter our country,” he added. Excessive caution or “overcompliance” by banks and pharmaceutical companies wary of falling afoul of US sanctions is a significant factor in limiting Iran’s access to funds for imports of medicines and medical equipment. As former French ambassador to Washington Gérard Araud told a Hudson Institute gathering in October 2018, “the fact is that banks are so terrified by the sanctions that they don’t want anything to do with Iran.” In the case of the specialized bandages needed for patients with epidermolysis bullosa, Human Rights Watch found evidence that a European company refused to sell the bandages as a result of sanctions despite the humanitarian exemption. In two other instances, Human Rights Watch reviewed correspondence from banks refusing to authorize humanitarian transactions with Iran after the imposition of sanctions. This fear has even caused problems for humanitarian actors supporting thousands of Afghan refugees in Iran. The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) is the largest of five international NGOs working in Iran, where they have implemented programs in areas like education for over seven years. However, they are now facing similar hurdles financing their operations due to sanctions. “We have now, for a full year, tried to find banks that are able and willing to transfer money from donors [for our humanitarian operations],” said NRC head Jan Egeland in August 2019, “but we are hitting a brick wall on every side. Norwegian and other international banks are afraid of US sanctions to transfer the money that governments have given for our vital aid work.”

#### Sanctions which do not adequately consider human rights do significant harm to those targeted

HRW 18

Human Rights Watch (an international non-governmental organization, headquartered in New York City, that conducts research and advocacy on human rights), "US Economic Sanctions Harm Iranians’ Right to Health | HRW", 10/29/19, https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/10/29/maximum-pressure/us-economic-sanctions-harm-iranians-right-health -CD

A country or coalition of states enforcing economic sanctions should consider the impact on the human rights of the affected population, especially regarding their access to goods essential to life, including medicines and food. Open-ended and comprehensive sanctions such as those that the Trump administration has imposed on Iran have negatively impacted the humanitarian needs and the enjoyment of human rights of Iran’s general population. Human Rights Watch opposes sanctions that have a disproportionately negative impact on the enjoyment of human rights by civilian populations, or create unnecessary suffering, in particular for vulnerable populations.

#### Sanctions are not effective in achieving strategic goals

Katzman 19

Kenneth Katzman (Kenneth Katzman is a specialist on Iran at the Congressional Research Service), The Atlantic Council, "Under US sanctions, Iran regional influence grows - Atlantic Council", 7/26/19, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/under-us-sanctions-iran-regional-influence-grows/ -CD

Trump has asserted that the re-imposition of sanctions has made Iran “a much different country.” He and other US officials state that the sanctions, including the May termination of sanctions exceptions under a 2011 law penalizing the banks of countries that do not reduce their purchases of Iranian crude oil, have devastated Iran’s economy and caused Iran to retrench in the region. A wide range of observations and data support the former assertion, but not the latter—suggesting that the economic effects of sanctions do not necessarily translate into strategic gains for US policy. The re-imposition of sanctions has, without question, harmed Iran’s economy. The International Monetary Fund estimates that Iran’s GDP will shrink by at least 6 percent for the March 2019-March 2020 period—a severe recession, although not a collapse. Prior to the US withdrawal from the JCPOA, Iran’s economy had been expected to continue to rebound from the depressed, pre-nuclear accord levels experienced during 2011-2016. The termination of oil purchase sanctions exceptions has driven Iran’s vital oil exports to lows not seen since the eight-year Iran-Iraq War, when Iraqi jets bombed Iran’s oil export terminals constantly. Absent any oil-related sanctions, Iran’s baseline crude oil exports are about 2.5 million barrels per day. But, for June 2019, the first full month after sanctions exceptions were terminated, Iran only exported about 300,000 barrels per day—far below what most analysts estimate Iran requires to avoid significant financial austerity. Furthermore, the availability of key medicines, particularly expensive chemotherapy and other drugs, has been reduced substantially because of Iran’s inability to secure trade credits to buy large quantities of these items. These effects are similar to those of 2011-2016, when the Obama administration escalated sanctions in order to persuade Iran to negotiate limits to its nuclear program—limits that were encapsulated by the JCPOA. If sanctions translated into changes in Iran’s regional behavior, it would be expected that Iran’s regional influence would have suffered setbacks during 2011-2016. Yet, events and trends demonstrated just the opposite or, at best, suggest that sanctions and Iran’s regional influence are independent of each other. In 2013, during a period of maximum economic effect of sanctions on Iran’s economy, Iran was able to intervene in the Syria civil war, taking decisive action to maintain the Bashar al-Assad regime’s grip on power. Iran not only sent its own Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force (IRGC QF) advisers to help organize the Assad regime’s defenses, but it also facilitated the armed intervention of Lebanese Hezbollah in Syria on Assad’s behalf. Iran furthermore was able to financially entice and organize thousands of Afghan and Pakistani Shias into new units—the Fatimiyoun and Zaynabiyoun divisions—to fight in Syria. Nor did sanctions prevent Iran from providing Assad with at least $1 billion in credits each year during 2012-2016, including the provision of gratis oil. In 2014, with international sanctions still applying severe pressure to Iran’s economy, Iran was easily able to intervene in Iraq to help halt the advance of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) toward the Iran-Iraq border. Tehran sent IRGC QF advisers to organize and field a variety of Iran-backed Shia militias, and to recruit additional Shia fighters, to fight alongside an Iraqi military that had largely collapsed in the face of the ISIS onslaught. In parallel, the United States sent forces to help reorganize the Iraqi Army to face the severe challenge. Sanctions also did not stop Iran from taking advantage of the battlefield success of the Houthi movement in Yemen. Iran helped them not only confront a Saudi-led Arab coalition that was assembled with the express purpose of rolling back Iran’s regional influence by defeating the Houthis, but has also armed the Houthis to the point where they are able to launch missiles into Saudi Arabia and threaten shipping in the vital Bab el-Mandeb. More than four years later, the Arab coalition is bogged down, fracturing, and looking for ways to exit the conflict. In 2019, Trump administration officials assert that the US maximum pressure campaign is already working to roll back Iran’s regional influence. In particular, they cite reports that Iran’s chief proxy, Hezbollah, has acknowledged financial constraints by appealing for public donations. However, there are no indications that either Iran’s nor Hezbollah’s capabilities or intent to continue helping Assad have changed. Both remain significantly engaged in Syria, and Iran’s posture in Iraq, Yemen, and elsewhere remains virtually unchanged. Administration policy might potentially induce Iran into negotiations on a revised JCPOA that might involve Iranian concessions on issues not explicitly restricted in the 2015 agreement, such as Iran’s development of ballistic missiles. But, because Iran’s regional activities are at the core of its ideology and its strategy for defending the revolutionary regime, it is virtually certain that there will be no alteration of its regional policy that is either compelled by sanctions or demanded in negotiations.

#### Sanctions polarize local politics and increase nationalism within the sanctioned country, leading to more radical behavior

Perletta 18

Giorgia Perletta (Giorgia Perletta is a Ph.D. Candidate in Institutions and Policies at Catholic University of Milan, Italy. She has been a visiting researcher at the University of Toronto and received her two M.A.s in International Relations and in Middle Eastern studies at the Catholic University of Milan), The Atlantic Council, "New Wave of Sanctions Spurs Iranian Political Repositioning - Atlantic Council", 11/19/18, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/new-wave-of-sanctions-spurs-iranian-political-repositioning/ -CD

While ordinary Iranians struggle to find imported medicine and buy basic foods due to re-imposed sanctions, the political debate inside the Islamic Republic is anything but static. As announced, the new wave of US secondary sanctions came into force on November 5. This came after unsuccessful efforts by Europe to dissuade President Donald Trump from unilaterally quitting the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and despite efforts to persuade European countries to retain their trade with Iran through a so-called blocking statute and a Special Purpose Vehicle. The Trump administration has allowed eight countries—China, India, South Korea, Turkey, Italy, Greece, Japan and Taiwan—to continue to buy reduced amounts of Iranian oil for the next six months. During this period, the administration appears to believe that Iran can be convinced to return to the negotiating table to reach a new JCPOA more favourable to the United States and its Middle Eastern allies. If this scenario appears plausible, it is unlikely that the United States will abandon its belligerent and threatening tones towards Tehran. Beyond seeking more stringent curbs on Iran’s nuclear program, the Trump administration is also looking to limit Iran’s regional posture and intervention in conflicts in Syria and Yemen. These efforts are unlikely to change the conduct of Iranian foreign policy, as Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Zarif has reiterated. However, the escalating US pressures have become a factor in factional fighting within Iran. New internal challenges are paving the way for a potential redefinition of political alliances. The moderate-conservative front that supported the JCPOA is facing harsh criticism from hardliners, while the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is seeking to avoid internal divisions by emphasising self-sufficiency and unity. In the last few months, however, the government of President Hassan Rouhani has been hit by—often involuntary—resignations, including the ministers of the economy (Masoud Karbasian), labor (Ali Rabiei), industry, mines and trade (Mohammad Shariatmadari who replaced Rabiei as labor minister), and roads and urban development (Abbas Akhoundi). The government reshuffle highlights the president’s difficulties in maintaining his political line and on-going polarization and political fragmentation in the Iranian political elite. Hardliners invariably accuse the Rouhani government of “having sold out the country” to historical enemies. When parliament recently passed legislation to counter terrorism-financing and money laundering, as required by the Paris-based Financial Action Task Force to keep Iran off its black list, the speaker of the parliament, Ali Larijani, was accused of betraying the nation by supporting these bills. It is interesting to note the controversial statement by Zarif who confirmed the presence of money laundering operations in Iran. Without mentioning any specific person, the minister has accused the opponents of the bill of having benefited from these operations and therefore trying to prevent their control and regulations. Larijani emerged as a key defender of the technocratic program, recognizing the importance of avoiding even more isolation at a time of renewed US sanctions. Larijani’s move alienated hardliners but appears to have helped him gain support from Iranian reformists, opening the possibility that he could be a consensus reformist-pragmatist candidate to succeed Rouhani after the next presidential elections in 2021. This sort of endorsement of Larijani by exponents of the reformist group shows how hardliners and more radical groups that seek to benefit from sanctions could be prevented from gaining power. These groups rely on the dissatisfaction of the lower middle classes toward the neoliberal policies adopted by the pragmatists. Yet, as shown by the recent street protests in Iran, it is precisely the lower classes that complain about the inconsistency between the slogans of the revolution and continuous social inequity. Radical candidates do have a chance of winning elections if turnout is low as occurred with the 2005 election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Rouhani, who cannot run for a third consecutive term, has been criticised by top reformists for not having fulfilled his electoral promises to improve the economy and open more space for civil society. This shows the fragility of the “alliance” between reformists and pragmatists and the difficulty of establishing fixed categories in Iranian politics. These two groups have often overlapped in their political ambitions and coalesced in 2009 after the fraud-tainted re-election of Ahmadinejad and again in 2013 and 2017 to support Rouhani. Nevertheless, they historically have supported different views and priorities. At this stage, of course, it is early to identify viable candidates for the 2021 elections. Iranian voters are increasingly disillusioned by all factions and may need someone more charismatic than Larijani—a regime stalwart who ran unsuccessfully for president in 2005—to lure them back to the voting booth. What we are now witnessing in Iran is a crisis of charismatic political leaders. Political polarization has so far not produced a charismatic figure, with the result of increased popular disaffection with the system. The impasse with the United States has always remained a problem that no political group has been able to overcome in part because of continuous internal factionalism and fear that one faction would benefit at the expense of the others if the US and Iran end their long divide. For the next elections, we can expect a low turnout, especially if the proposed candidates will be those names that have dominated the last 20 years of Iranian politics. Anti-systemic groups, such as Ahmadinejad’s movement, are excluded from official politics, even if its message continues to spread with doubtful results. A key determinant will be how successful Iran is at surviving sanctions and whether any of the candidates on offer have a strategy to relieve sanctions and mitigate the renewed hostility emanating from Washington.

#### Sanctions exacerbate internal political unrest, killing democracy in the region

Peksen & Drury 10

Dursun Peksen & A. Cooper Drury (2010) Coercive or Corrosive: The Negative Impact of Economic Sanctions on Democracy, International Interactions, 36:3, 240-264, DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2010.502436 -CD

This article seeks to analyze the impact that sanctions have on democracy. We argue that economic sanctions worsen the level of democracy because the economic hardship caused by sanctions can be used as a strategic tool by the targeted regime to consolidate authoritarian rule and weaken the opposition. Furthermore, we argue that economic sanctions create new incentives for the political leadership to restrict political liberties, to undermine the challenge of sanctions as an external threat to their authority. Using time-series cross-national data (1972–2000), the findings show that both the immediate and longer‐term effects of economic sanctions significantly reduce the level of democratic freedoms in the target. The findings also demonstrate that comprehensive economic sanctions have greater negative impact than limited sanctions. These findings suggest that sanctions can create negative externalities by reducing the political rights and civil liberties in the targeted state.

# Negative

## NC

### Definitions

#### Secondary Sanctions

Moehr 18

Ole Moehr (Ole Moehr serves as an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Global Business & Economics Program), The Atlantic Council, "Secondary Sanctions: A First Glance - Atlantic Council", Feb 6, 2018, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/econographics/ole-moehr-3/ -CD

Primary sanctions, such as asset freezes and trade embargoes, prohibit citizens and companies of the sanctioning country from engaging in certain activities with their counterparts from the sanctioned country. For example, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the US government, prohibited, among other things, new investment in Crimea by US persons. Secondary sanctions put pressure on third parties to stop their activities with the sanctioned country by threatening to cut-off the third party’s access to the sanctioning country. Recent US sanctions against Iran illustrate this example well. With the ultimate goal to stop Iran’s nuclear program, US secondary sanctions gave financial institutions around the world a choice to either halt transactions with Iranian banks or lose access to the US financial system. Combined with additional secondary sanctions targeting Iran’s energy sector and broad multilateral support, these financial sanctions succeeded in bringing Iran to the negotiating table.

### Framework

#### Value: Justice as Fairness

Wenar 17

Leif Wenar, "John Rawls", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017) https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/rawls/ -CD

Rawls's negative thesis starts with the idea that citizens do not deserve to be born into a rich or a poor family, to be born naturally more or less gifted than others, to be born female or male, to be born a member of a particular racial group, and so on. Since these features of persons are morally arbitrary in this sense, citizens are not entitled to more of the benefits of social cooperation simply because of them. For example the fact that a citizen was born rich, white, and male provides no reason in itself for this citizen to be favored by social institutions.

This negative thesis does not say how social goods should be distributed; it merely clears the decks. Rawls's positive distributive thesis is equality-based reciprocity. All social goods are to be distributed equally, unless an unequal distribution would be to everyone's advantage. The guiding idea is that since citizens are fundamentally equal, reasoning about justice should begin from a presumption that cooperatively-produced goods should be equally divided. Justice then requires that any inequalities must benefit all citizens, and particularly must benefit those who will have the least. Equality sets the baseline; from there any inequalities must improve everyone's situation, and especially the situation of the worst-off. These strong requirements of equality and reciprocal advantage are hallmarks of Rawls's theory of justice.

#### Criterion: (Political) Realism

Korab-Karpowicz 18

W. Julian Korab-Karpowicz, "Political Realism in International Relations", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/realism-intl-relations -CD

Realists consider the principal actors in the international arena to be states, which are concerned with their own security, act in pursuit of their own national interests, and struggle for power.

#### Thesis: US secondary sanctions play an important role in regulating international peace and global well-being. From a politically realistic perspective, international conflict, along with the occasional emergence of authoritarianism, is inevitable. Secondary sanctions limit the harm both can do. As such, it is imperative we keep this diplomatic tool, and appropriately deploy it where needed.

### Contention 1: Secondary sanctions prevent military conflict and aggression

#### Iranian sanctions have prevented the spread of terrorism in the region

Chemali 19

Hagar Hajjar Chemali (Middle East policy advisor at the US Treasury Department’s office of terrorist financing and financial crimes in the Obama administration. Among her other government roles, she was director for Syria and Lebanon at the National Security Council at the White House.), Euractive, The Syndication Bureau, "Trump’s sanctions are working and will prevent war with Iran", 6/14/19, https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/opinion/trumps-sanctions-are-working-and-will-prevent-war-with-iran/ -CD

Iran sanctions are on the rise again, and more are coming. Iran is engaged in a series of missteps that will land it further in financial pain, rather than war. The reason for that is because from the Trump administration’s point of view, these sanctions are working to achieve their goals. On Thursday (June 13), the Iranian regime allegedly orchestrated attacks against two oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman. This development followed a report by the International Atomic Energy Agency confirming that Iran was increasing its production rate of low-enriched uranium. These actions on the part of Iran follow a series of sanctions from the US Treasury Department, which on Wednesday (June 12) imposed sanctions on a financial conduit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force, and last week (June 7) sanctioned Iran’s largest petrochemical holding group. Washington accused Iran of carrying out attacks that left two tankers ablaze in the Gulf of Oman on Thursday (13 June), escalating tensions across the region. US officials are also considering sanctions against the Iranian financial body that was established as a trade channel with Europe – a move that would underscore US intolerance to any international workarounds to the Iran sanctions campaign. You don’t need to read the tea leaves closely to know the administration’s plan for its “maximum pressure” campaign. But one thing the tea leaves don’t show are plans for war. And the reason is simple: the sanctions are working to help achieve President Donald Trump’s priority goal, which is to undermine Iran’s influence and support for terrorism in the Middle East. The Treasury’s latest steps follow a State Department press briefing, during which its spokesperson, Morgan Ortagus, listed the negative effects Iran sanctions were having on that country’s terrorist proxies and on its other actions in the region. She pointed to the Lebanese group Hezbollah’s “pleas for public donations via billboards, posters and collection cans” and stressed that “Iran is withdrawing Hezbollah fighters from Syria and cutting or canceling their salaries.” This is a big deal. She also pointed to Hamas’s austerity plan in Gaza and to the IRGC’s budget cuts for Iraq Shia militia groups. She highlighted fuel shortages in Syria due to the cut in Iranian oil supply and noted the IRGC cyber command “is short on cash.” Others have also picked up on this emerging trend: that Iran sanctions are starving Iran’s proxies of critical funds. The Washington Post reported that US sanctions against Iran have “curtailed” Iran’s finances to Hezbollah, which “has seen a sharp fall in its revenue and is being forced to make draconian cuts to its spending.” A fighter with an Iranian-backed militia in Syria told The New York Times that he lost a third of his salary and other benefits, lamenting, “Iran doesn’t have enough money to give us.” When he withdrew the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or what is often called the Iran nuclear deal, last year, President Trump made his top goal clear. Before even addressing Iran’s nuclear capabilities or speaking about working toward a new agreement, he emphasised Iran’s support for terrorism and plans for regional influence as among his key concerns and reasons for withdrawing from the deal. Working to undermine that behavior has been the administration’s top priority in its Iran policy. Take Hezbollah. If you look closely, the US has worked over many years to inflict financial pain on the terrorist organisation. Could heavy Iran sanctions be the arrow through Hezbollah’s heart? The US government says its Iran sanctions are having an effect in inflicting financial pain on the group. But we also know that Hezbollah maintains global business enterprises and active global criminal activity to heavily supplement its allowance from Iran. Dating back to the Bush administration, the US Treasury has focused on targeting Hezbollah’s business operations and sanctions-evasion conduits to further expose its illicit financial behavior and to rachet up pressure on it. And those efforts have increased over the years. Furthermore, the threat of secondary sanctions and deliberately broad language in the Hezbollah International Financing Prevention Amendment Act, passed last year, has made Lebanese banks uncertain as to who or what the Treasury Department will target next – a maneuver that helps deter anyone from doing business with it. In order to further isolate Hezbollah and undermine its influence, however, more needs to be done to expose and target Hezbollah’s global business and criminal behavior, particularly by the US’s global partners and by Europe, specifically. Nonetheless, Iran sanctions, while not the silver bullet, are making a real, tangible difference. If the goal is to undermine Iran’s nefarious behavior and the strong support it offers to terrorist groups and other militants in the region, then the strategy appears to be working. And for that reason, the administration is likely to continue focusing on targeted financial measures as its tool of choice.

#### Sanctions applied to Russia stopped it from pushing further into Ukraine and the Balkans, preventing an all out war

Gelyastanov 15

Alim Gelyastanov (Alim is a data analyst who spent six years working as an analyst for the US government, and ten years of project coordination for the International Society for Human Rights), Bankable Insight, "Do Sanctions Cause War or Deter It?", April 2015, <https://www.bankableinsight.com/do-sanctions-cause-war-or-deter-it.html> -CD

The sanctions against Russia have already had an impact in the short term and will continue to do so. First, they made Russia seriously factor in possible Western responses to its actions in Ukraine, which seems not to have been the case prior to the annexation of Crimea. The sanctions, in other words, constrained Russia, as they deterred the Kremlin from seizing even bigger chunks of territory. The sanctions are at least in part responsible for the separatist areas of eastern Ukraine forming only a tiny part of what is called by nationalist elements of the Russian public Novorossia. The coastal city of Mariupol was not seized by Russia, when it easily could have been. There has been no attempt by Russian forces to forge a corridor bridging mainland Russia to Crimea, let alone the territories farther west, such as Odessa and Transnistria. Even if the sanctions do not help the US with its policy on Crimea, they do minimise the risk that Russia will seek to openly destabilise other parts of Ukraine or perhaps, Moldova and Georgia. At a global level, sanctions also signalled to other actors that unilateral military ventures will come at a cost. Equally important is that sanctions shattered Putin’s ‘contract’ with the Russian people: namely, improving collective prosperity in exchange for accepting authoritarianism and the siphoning off of Russia’s riches by elites. The restrictive measures, combined with the other factors now hitting the country’s economy, are forcing Putin to tentatively replace this model with nationalism and anti-Westernism. Whereas military actions can have short term consequences, economic sanctions are designed to make an impact in the medium to long term. In this current crisis, Russia has acted like a sprinter, and the West, a long-distance runner: the sanctions are about turning the confrontation over Ukraine from an unwinnable dash into a winnable marathon. Another important factor is that sanctions can be preventive. Western sanctions on Russia are designed to curb further Russian aggression in Ukraine or in other post-Soviet states in the future. Perhaps the non-escalation of the conflict across Ukraine or its non-extension to places such as Moldova, can be considered the greatest achievement of the restrictive measures. It is important to consider, in today’s nuclear world there’s no viable alternative to economic sanctions against warmongering dictators, except an all out war or humiliating appeasement and retreat.

#### Secondary sanctions applied to countries trading with North Korea would put significant pressure on it to stop provoking its neighbors into war and end nuclear proliferation in the region

Magsamen, Hart, & Singh 17

Kelly Magsamen (Kelly Magsamen is vice president for National Security and International Policy at the Center for American Progress and former principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific security affairs.), Melanie Hart (Melanie Hart is a senior fellow and director of China Policy at the Center.), Michael Fuchs, and Vikram Singh (Vikram Singh is a senior adviser at the Center and a former deputy assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific security affairs.), Center for American Progress, "A Responsible Approach to North Korea", 11/2/17, <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2017/11/02/442030/responsible-approach-north-korea/> -CD

Economic pressure is the best lever the United States has for increasing the costs Pyongyang bears for maintaining its current weapons trajectory. We do not know if sanctions pressure can push Kim Jong Un to talk. What we do know, however, is that sanctions can increase Kim Jong Un’s incentives to negotiate; give the United States more tools to work with in a potential future negotiation; and reduce the regime’s ability to source foreign technology components for its nuclear and missile programs.12 A targeted sanctions strategy that effectively isolates North Korea from the global economy will weaken North Korea’s position and put the United States in a stronger position for either diplomacy or containment. North Korea is not a hermit kingdom. It is more dependent on international trade and financial transfers today than at any point in the nation’s history, and that creates vulnerabilities the international community has only recently begun to exploit.13 North Korea has been under U.N. sanctions since 2006. However, until 2017, those sanctions did not aim for broad economic isolation. Where restrictions did exist, some nations—most notably China—failed to implement them, providing North Korea with multiple options for sanction evasion.14 In fact, North Korea’s international trade grew around 5 percent in 2016, and according to Bank of Korea estimates, the nation’s gross domestic product grew around 4 percent.15 Kim Jong Un has adapted to pre-2017 U.N. restrictions by opening up for private commerce and by allowing political and business elites to profit from innovative commercial strategies and financial transactions. This approach circumvents sanctions, generates growth, and brings in foreign technologies, including technologies that support the regime’s weapons programs. Going forward, the United States should leverage a more targeted sanction strategy to force Pyongyang to choose between weapons advancements and growth. In addition to targeting new vulnerabilities and aiming for broad economic isolation, those sanctions will need to move on a quicker timeline than they have in the last decade, making clear the immediate costs of noncompliance. And sanctions must come with a diplomatic off-ramp, making clear—to Kim Jong Un and the elites who will face particularly great financial loss under a tightened sanction regime—that relief is possible if North Korea agrees to certain steps.

### Contention 2: Secondary sanctions weaken authoritarian regimes’ capacity to violate human rights

#### New major secondary sanctions against Assad will finally be able to stop Russia and Iran from propping up the regime

Adesnik & Dershowitz 20

David Adesnik (David Adesnik is a senior fellow and director of research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies), Toby Dershowitz (Toby Dershowitz is senior vice president for government relations and strategy at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies), Foreign Policy, "Sanctions on Syria Can Help Stop Assad’s Atrocities", 6/17/20, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/17/sanctions-against-syria-will-help-not-harm-civilians/ -CD

In person, Caesar is calm and speaks patiently. When he fled Syria, where he served as a military photographer, he brought with him 55,000 images of the burned, strangled, and whipped corpses that President Bashar al-Assad’s interrogators dispatched to the morgue. Rage or depression would seem more appropriate for an individual who risked his life to deliver irrefutable proof of the Assad regime’s mass atrocities, only to see the massacres continue amid U.S. and allied inaction. Instead, he has helped push for U.S. sanctions against Assad. On June 17, almost six years after Caesar’s first public remarks in front of congressional leaders, the sanctions legislation that bears his name took effect after passing late last year as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020. The sanctions passed with firm backing from the White House and vocal support from both Democrats and Republicans on Capitol Hill. The legislation is unlikely to have a sudden and dramatic impact on the Syrian economy; rather, it aims to sap the Assad regime gradually of the resources that fuel its atrocities. The law also threatens to sanction any foreign company that contracts with the regime to participate in reconstruction efforts, which would relieve Russia and Iran of the costs of propping up a failed state. An Iranian legislator recently said Iran had spent $20 billion to $30 billion on Syria, while foreign scholars have arrived at a figure as high as $15 billion per year, or $105 billion as of 2018. Russia spends an estimated $1 billion per year on the war, while it has loaned Assad $3 billion. While U.S. President Donald Trump signed the Caesar sanctions into law last December, the legislation mandated a 180-day waiting period before the administration could impose new sanctions. During those six months, a financial crisis in next-door Lebanon has had the kind of devastating impact on the Syrian economy that no sanctions regime could design. Lebanon’s heavily dollarized economy served as Syria’s main source of hard currency amid U.S. and EU sanctions; when Lebanese banks restricted access, demand for U.S. dollars in Syria began to dramatically outstrip supply. This culminated in the free fall of the Syrian lira, which traded at 515 to the dollar last June, and 1,500 just a month ago, before bottoming out at just under 3,200 to the dollar last week. The collapse of the lira brought with it rapid inflation. The United Nations’ World Food Programme estimated in April that the cost of a basket of basic goods such as flour and oil had increased by 111 percent over the previous 12 months. Already impoverished by the war and reliant on foreign aid, Syrians are increasingly going hungry, even in areas where Assad’s grip has long been firm. Restrictions put in place to prevent the spread of COVID-19 made the situation more dire, although the regime has begun to lift them. Last week, Assad fired Prime Minister Imad Khamis as public anger rose in areas under the regime’s control. The population of major urban centers seems resigned to Assad’s rule, but there have been unprecedented protests in the southern province of Suwayda, where demonstrators called for Assad’s ouster. The deprivation Syrians were already enduring raises the perennial question of whether the sanctions will strike a balance between the pressure they exert on rogue regimes and the costs they inflict on civilians. The deprivation Syrians were already enduring raises the perennial question of whether the sanctions will strike a balance between the pressure they exert on rogue regimes and the costs they inflict on civilians. In the case of Syria, the grisly evidence of systematic mass torture has minimized the extent to which elected officials on either side of the Atlantic have questioned the justice of sanctioning Assad and his accomplices. Still, there are a handful of analysts who equate the thinking behind the Caesar Act with the mentality of the Assad regime.

#### Sanctions prevent conflict escalation and spread

Brubaker & Dörfler 17

Rebecca Brubaker (United Nations University), Thomas Dörfler (United Nations University), United Nations University Centre for Policy Research, Conflict Prevention Series: No. 4, "UN Sanctions and the Prevention of Conflict", August 2017 https://i.unu.edu/media/cpr.unu.edu/attachment/2578/UNSanctionsandPreventionConflict-Aug-2017.pdf -CD

By the time UN sanctions regimes are established, conflict situations have almost always become entrenched. But even though sanctions are most often imposed “mid-conflict”, they can still assist in stemming escalation. First, UN sanctions can help keep levels of conflict in check through shifting conflict actors’ incentives away from violence. Conflict actors must, at multiple points throughout a conflict, decide whether or not violence is a more effective means of achieving their goals than institutional routes, negotiation, and other non-violent means. Sanctions, can serve as one additional counterweight in conflicts actors’ risk assessments. Sanctions, however, are not sufficient as a counterweight. They must be applied in conjunction with other tools such as peacekeeping, national, regional and/or international judicial processes, use of force, and other appropriate inducements. Second, UN sanctions can help prevent conflict escalation through cutting off much needed sources of funds, arms and soldiers. For a conflict to escalate there need to be channels of wider mobilization of recruits, financial resources and arms.

#### Sanctions have limited effects on allies, but severely constrain future negative actions from targeted regimes

Slobodian & Ptasnyk 19

Nataliia Slobodian (Head of Strategic Planning and Analysis Division, SE NEC Ukrenergo. She is Habilitated Doctor of Human Sciences in world history), Iryna Ptasnyk (PhD at the Law Institute of Vasyl Stefanyk Precarpathian National University), Europe Now Journal, "Sanctions on Russia: Effectiveness and Impacts", 2/4/19, https://www.europenowjournal.org/2019/02/04/sanctions-on-russia-effectiveness-and-impacts/ -CD

The effect of sanctions on the US economy has been extremely limited, largely due to the relatively small share of Russian trade within the wider US economy. GDP growth in the US has remained positive since the imposition of sanctions, although export and import trade volumes with Russia have decreased in the years following. Similarly, GDP growth has stayed positive within the EU, although trade with Russia composes a larger share of the total economy. The impact has consequently been greater on the EU, although its worst effects appear to have been mitigated. In 2015, Russia was the EU’s fourth largest trading partner, compared to the 30th largest trading partner for the US. In Russia, on the other hand, GDP growth has decreased since the imposition of sanctions, contracting by 2.8 percent in 2015. While it is harder to causally link the impact of sanctions with Russia’s decline in economic growth, it appears the decrease in trade has impacted the country’s economic prospects. The future of the sanctions regime seems to hinge primarily on the political interests of the US and the EU – the opposition to sanctions by some leading EU member states as well as reticence by the Trump administration to crack down on Russia provide areas of concern for the sustained imposition of sanctions. Nevertheless, the US’ announcement of a new round of sanctions on selected Russian elites in March 2018 provides some guarded optimism that sanctions will be upheld over the near future. It is necessary to voice some skepticism regarding the actual potential of sanctions to change or moderate Russian behavior. The Graduate Institute’s Targeted Sanctions Consortium analyzed the usage of sanctions by the UN specifically and found that on average sanctions are effective in achieving their stated goals approximately 31 percent of the time. Sanctions are ultimately more effective at signaling or constraining than eliciting a change in behavior. Thus, the US and EU sanctions against Russia provide a united front to challenge Russia’s increasing aggression and disregard for international law, but they are less likely to produce a change in Russia’s current actions. The continued use of sanctions may help to limit future behavior through the increasing of perceived costs of aggression by Russia, while also providing a deliberate effort to delegitimize acts that violate international law. It follows that while the sanctions regime may be unable to force Russia to abandon its illegal annexation of Crimea, the sanctions are still worthwhile in preventing similar behavior in the future.

## NC Blocks/Extensions

#### Secondary sanctions have been applied to Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela

Control Risk 19

Control Risk (specialist risk consultancy that helps to create secure, compliant and resilient organisations in an age of ever-changing risk.), "Navigating the global sanctions landscape in 2020", Oct 2019, https://ml.globenewswire.com/Resource/Download/c0114454-5fbc-4870-ae83-936b64328d83 -CD

Primary sanctions are restrictions applied to US persons, while secondary sanctions apply to non-US persons and are designed to prevent non-US persons from doing business with a target of primary US sanctions. They have mainly been used in connection to Iran, North Korea and most recently Venezuela. There is very limited precedent for the enforcement of secondary sanctions. However, the prospective penalties that secondary sanctions could impose on non-US organisations is often enough to encourage compliance with them.

#### Secondary sanctions have been applied to Russia

Newlin 18

Cyrus Newlin (Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program), Center for Strategic and International Studies, "U.S. Sanctions against Russia: What You Need to Know", 10/31/18, https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-sanctions-against-russia-what-you-need-know -CD

Sanctions that target Russian individuals and companies for failing to comply with other sanction programs, such as those on North Korea, have been successful in restricting access to the global financial system. Secondary sanctions mandated by CAATSA have surely made it harder for sanctioned Russian entities to do business

#### The suffering of people in sanctioned countries would exist with or without sanctions, humanitarian aid in Syria proves

Brubaker & Dörfler 17

Rebecca Brubaker (United Nations University), Thomas Dörfler (United Nations University), United Nations University Centre for Policy Research, Conflict Prevention Series: No. 4, "UN Sanctions and the Prevention of Conflict", August 2017 https://i.unu.edu/media/cpr.unu.edu/attachment/2578/UNSanctionsandPreventionConflict-Aug-2017.pdf -CD

According to Aron Lund of the Century Foundation, “Both sides seem to be operating on the principle of ‘Assad or we burn the country.’” Lund elaborated, “One side has shown itself willing to bomb, starve and shell Syrian cities to cinders to prevent Assad’s removal. The other side seems just as determined to destroy Syria’s economy and keep the war smoldering forever to stop Assad from claiming victory.” Yet extensive U.S. and European efforts to relieve the suffering of Syrian civilians belie such accusations of cruel indifference. For the duration of the war, they have paired their sanctions with billions of dollars of humanitarian aid every year, which is delivered mainly by the United Nations and its partner nongovernmental organizations. The U.N. humanitarian response plan for 2019 entailed the provision of direct assistance to 9 million individuals in Syria. To mitigate the suffering that persists despite historic levels of aid, what Syria needs is not fewer sanctions but a root-and-branch reform of the U.N. machinery for delivering aid, which Assad has coopted to the point where U.N. agencies have become de facto adjuncts to the siege of civilian populations and other war crimes. Lengthy reports from human rights advocates, along with a disturbing internal review by U.N. staff, have documented the U.N.’s departure from the core humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence. For years, the U.N. has let the Assad regime give direct aid to supportive populations while systematically blocking deliveries to areas outside of its control. Besieging civilian populations is a war crime, yet convoys en route to deliveries in regime-held areas would pass through besieged neighborhoods without aiding their inhabitants. Annie Sparrow, a pediatrician and professor of public health, has monitored the World Health Organization’s deference to the regime, which included parroting the Syrian Ministry of Health’s denials of a polio outbreak despite evidence the disease had begun to spread.

#### Secondary sanctions aren’t responsible for the misallocation of public funds in other countries

Bahar, Bustos, Morales-Arilla, Santos 19

Dany Bahar (Senior Fellow - Global Economy and Development), Sebastian Bustos (Research Fellow, Center for International Development - Harvard University), José Morales-Arilla (Advisor - Workforce of the Future initiative at Brookings), Miguel Ángel Santos (Director of Applied Research, Center for International Development - Harvard University), Brookings, "Impact of the 2017 sanctions on Venezuela: Revisiting the evidence", 5/14/19, https://www.brookings.edu/research/revisiting-the-evidence-impact-of-the-2017-sanctions-on-venezuela/ -CD

In a paper titled “Economic sanctions as collective punishment: The case of Venezuela” (Weisbrot and Sachs, 2019), the authors—henceforth referred to as WS—set out to assess the causal effects of the financial sanctions imposed by the United States on Venezuela in August 2017. The authors conclude that “sanctions reduced the public’s caloric intake, increased disease and mortality (for both adults and infants), and displaced millions of Venezuelans who fled the country as a result of the worsening economic depression and hyperinflation.” WS also claim that “sanctions have inflicted […] very serious harm to human life and health, including an estimated more than 40,000 deaths from 2017-2018.” In this paper, we revisit the evidence for these claims and present several findings. We find the methodology used by WS is unfit to estimate the causal effect of the 2017 sanctions on the Venezuelan economy, and thus their conclusions are invalid, for two main reasons. First, in the absence of a proper counterfactual, economic trends in Venezuela since the sanctions were imposed cannot be separated from the powerfully negative trends that preceded them. Second, several important confounding factors beyond sanctions, which any rigorous empirical exercise should account for, could also explain the deterioration studied by Weisbrot and Sachs (2019). Our other, perhaps even more important finding is that, when analyzing several socio-economic outcomes in Venezuela across time, it becomes clear that the bulk of the deterioration in living standards occurred long before the sanctions were enacted in 2017. Relatedly, we find rapidly worsening trends across all of the socio-economic indicators we analyze well before the sanctions were imposed in August 2017. Therefore, in the presence of these strong pre-trends, it is impossible to attribute the current performance of these socio-economic indicators to the sanctions. The trends displayed by these socio-economic indicators prior to the sanctions are quite striking. For instance, by 2016—the year before sanctions were imposed—food imports in the country had fallen by 71 percent from their 2013 peak. Imports of medicines and medical equipment fell by 68 percent between 2013 and 2016. In terms of calorie intake, we find that by August 2017 Venezuelans earning the minimum wage could only afford a maximum of 6,132 of the cheapest available calories per day— equivalent to 56 percent of the minimum dietary needs of a family of five. This is 92 percent fewer calories than the minimum wage could purchase in January 2010. Infant mortality, a good proxy for the quality of public health services, grew by 44 percent between 2013 and 2016 and has continued to do so since. No matter what socio-economic indicator one chooses to look at, it is clear that the sharp deterioration in Venezuela’s living standards started long before August 2017. The further deterioration observed since 2017—whether caused by the sanctions or by alternative factors—by no means constitutes the bulk of the collapse that has caused widespread suffering, death, and displacement to millions of Venezuelans.

#### Secondary sanctions are good backup for when diplomacy fails; this delays/prevents military intervention

Einhorn & Nephew 19

Robert Einhorn (Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative), Richard Nephew (Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center on 21st Century Security and Intelligence, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative) -CD

The United States needs a new strategy for effectively constraining Iran’s future nuclear capabilities. The Trump administration’s current approach has little chance of succeeding. But simply returning the United States to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is not a long-term solution. By the time the United States would return to the 2015 deal, key nuclear restrictions would soon expire. Moreover, achieving the wide domestic support needed to make a nuclear deal with Iran politically sustainable in the United States would not be served by simply turning the clock back to before Trump took office. The United States needs to pursue a renewed nuclear bargain with Iran, building on the solid foundation of the original and addressing its shortcomings. Diplomacy must play a central role in that effort, which will require: Mending fences with the Europeans and other key negotiating partners to rebuild the broad international support needed to press Iran to come to the negotiating table and accept meaningful restraints; Abandoning the current administration’s excessive demands in favor of a more realistic negotiating position that keeps Iran a safe and verifiable distance from the nuclear weapons threshold for an extended period of time, while demonstrating to Iran a willingness to accept an outcome compatible with Tehran’s legitimate interests; Pursuing a new deal focused on the nuclear issue, while actively and effectively— although separately and in parallel—implementing a broad strategy for addressing the other dimensions of the Iranian challenge, including its aggressive regional activities and its missile program; Improving the incentives (primarily sanctions relief) that would be offered to Iran, both in terms of their scope and their reliability to deliver anticipated benefits, in order to persuade Iran to accept a renewed bargain that goes beyond the JCPOA in important respects, especially in terms of the duration of its nuclear restrictions; and Making every effort to gain wide domestic support in the United States for any new negotiated outcome in order to make it durable and politically sustainable, despite presidential leadership transitions in Washington. While diplomacy should take center stage in efforts to constrain Iran’s future nuclear capabilities, diplomacy alone is not enough. The Trump administration’s anti-Iran campaign has put great pressure on Tehran, but it has also reinforced Iranian opposition to U.S. demands and resistance to even engaging with the United States. To promote productive negotiations—and in the event that negotiations fail—diplomacy will have to be complemented by other policy tools that do not require Iran’s participation or consent, such as sanctions, counterproliferation measures, and deterrence. These more coercive policy tools can impede and discourage Iran’s movement toward the nuclear weapons threshold and provide incentives for Iran to negotiate seriously. But in the end, nuclear restraint must be Iran’s choice and is best codified in a renewed nuclear agreement.

#### Ending secondary sanctions would undermine primary sanctions by enabling sanction evasion

CRS 20

Congressional Research Service, "US Sanctions on Russia", 1/17/20, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R45415.pdf> -CD

*(note: be careful with this card, only use to punish affs that go really small, not against generic “sanctions bad” affs)*

Sanctions that target third parties—those not engaged in the objectionable activity subject to sanctions but engaged with the individuals or entities that are—are popularly referred to as secondary sanctions. Secondary sanctions often are constructed to deter sanctions evasion, penalizing those that facilitate a means to avoid detection or that provide alternative access to finance

#### Ending secondary sanctions would remove the last chance of preventing armed conflict between feuding nations

Meyer 14

Jeffrey Meyer (Associate Professor of Law, Quinnipiac University School of Law), Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, "Second Thoughts on Secondary Sanctions", 2014, https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1151&context=jil -CD

This Article explores the legality of so-called “secondary sanctions” under customary principles of international jurisdiction law. Ordinarily, when the United States imposes economic sanctions, it imposes primary sanctions only—to restrict its own companies and citizens (or other people who are in the United States) from doing business with a rogue regime, terrorist group, or other international pariah. Secondary sanctions, such as secondary trade boycotts and foreign company divestment, involve additional economic restrictions designed to inhibit nonU.S. citizens and companies abroad from doing business with a target of primary U.S. sanctions. Secondary sanctions have proven highly controversial, in part because of broad claims that they are illegally “extraterritorial” in purpose and effect. This Article challenges the conventional view. It suggests that a wide range of secondary sanctions measures are permissible if tailored to regulate exclusively on “terrinational” grounds—on the combined basis of territorial and nationality jurisdiction. Secondary sanctions may seldom be wise as a matter of policy, but when primary sanctions fail, secondary sanctions may be a last alternative to the use of military force. Because the use of secondary sanctions has been complicated by lack of clarity about their legality, terrinational forms of secondary sanctions should be considered as an alternative to other more legally controversial forms of secondary sanctions.

#### Yes, economic sanctions empirically work, here are 13 examples

Taylor 14

Adam Taylor (Foreign reporter who writes about a variety of subjects), The Washington Post, "13 times that economic sanctions really worked", 4/28/14, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/04/28/13-times-that-economic-sanctions-really-worked/ -CD

Given that the concept has been around since at least the Greek ages\*, it's a little worrying that there is still so much debate about whether economic sanctions actually work or not. Right now, that problem appears especially acute: Sanctions seem to be the main, if not only, Western weapon for dealing with Russian aggression in Ukraine. Just Monday, the United States announced sanctions on those individuals close to President Vladimir Putin, part of a broader campaign of targeted visa bans and asset freezes on the Russian elite over Russia's actions in Ukraine. However, the success of the sanctions already in place is proving hard to ascertain: As Russia’s deputy prime minister said of the last round of U.S. efforts: "Send me your teeth ground in impotent rage." So when have economic sanctions actually worked? One of the best known investigations of that question is "Economic Sanctions Reconsidered," first published in 1985, by Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliott. That book, now on its third edition (from 2009), attempts to access the aims and success of every economic sanction for which it can find data. According to the latest edition, the sanctions listed below are the only instances from 1914 to 2008 in which not only was the stated goal of the measures reached, but the sanctions themselves were instrumental in achieving that goal – thus receiving a full rating of 16 out of 16. It isn't a long list, and many of the entries are a little obscure. Where possible, the cost to the nation targeted has been included: 1921: the League of Nations vs. Yugoslavia In 1921, the League of Nations threatened economic sanctions against Yugoslavia if it attempted to seize land from Albania. Yugoslavia backed down. 1925: the League of Nations vs. Greece Four years later, the League of Nations threatened sanctions against Greece unless it withdrew from Bulgaria's border territory. Greece withdrew. 1948-1949: the United States vs. Netherlands As the Dutch East Indies struggled to become an independent Indonesia after World War II, the United States suspended the Marshall Plan aid to authorities in the region after the Dutch arrested Indonesian leaders. After threats of sanctions, the Dutch agreed to Indonesian independence in 1949. The sanctions cost 1.1% of the Dutch gross national product. 1958-1959: the U.S.S.R. vs. Finland During the "Night Frost Crisis" of 1958 and 1959, Finnish-Soviet relations were fraught after the Communists were excluded from government and Karl-August Fagerholm, viewed as unfavorable to the Soviets, was appointed as prime minister. The U.S.S.R. used economic sanctions to force Fagerholm's resignation. The sanctions cost 1.1.% of the Finnish GNP. 1961-1965: the United States vs. Ceylon (Sri Lanka) Between 1961 and 1965, the United States applied sanctions against the Dominion of Ceylon (what is now Sri Lanka) after the socialist government of Sirimavo Bandaranaike was accused of expropriating the assets of U.S. and British oil companies. The government fell in 1965, largely because of the economic effects of these sanctions, which cost 0.6% of the the country's GNP. 1965-1967: the United States vs. India In 1965, the United States canceled food and military aid to India in a bid to force it to change its agricultural policies and to voice displeasure over its war with Pakistan earlier that year. In 1966, Indira Gandhi's government proposed new agricultural policies, and U.S. aid resumed the next year. The economic cost was 0.08% of the Indian GNP. 1975-1976: the United States vs. South Korea In 1975, the United States used the threat of sanctions to discourage South Korea from buying a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant from France, which the U.S. thought might be secretly used to help make nuclear bombs. South Korea never bought the plant. 1976-1977: the United States vs. Taiwan In 1976, the United States learned that Taiwan was secretly developing nuclear weapons, so the United States delayed its export of nuclear material to the country. Taiwan later announced that it was abandoning its plans. The estimated economic cost was 0.1% of Taiwan's GNP. 1982-1986: South Africa vs. Lesotho South Africa applied economic pressure on Lesotho to make it return South African refugees with links to the African National Congress. After a military coup in Lesotho, South Africa lifted a blockade on the landlocked nation, and 60 ANC members were deported back home. The cost was estimated to be 5.1% of Lesotho's GNP. 1987-1988: the United States vs. El Salvador In 1988, the United States used economic sanctions to block El Salvador from releasing those accused of killing U.S. citizens. 1992-1993: the United States vs. Malawi The United States (and other nations) significantly cut aid in 1992 in a bid to improve the democratic standards and human rights situation in Malawi. Malawi was largely reliant on aid (the sanctions were estimated to cost 6.6% of its GNP) and swiftly adopted more open policies. After a referendum, multi-party democracy was introduced in 1993, and aid was soon resumed. 1993: the United States vs. Guatemala In 1993, after President Jorge Serrano dissolved Congress and said he would rule by decree, the United States and European nations threatened sanctions. Business owners, scared of the economic effects, helped force Serrano out of power and installed a new president, Ramiro de Leon Carpio. The economic cost was said to be 1.3% of Guatemala's GDP. 1994-1995: Greece vs. Albania Greece suspended European Union aid to Albania in 1994 after five members of an ethnic Greek group in the country were given prison terms. After this economic pressure (said to have cost Albania 2.9% of its GNP), Albania reduced the sentences and released two, and Greece resumed aid.

#### Ongoing humanitarian aid is intended to offset poverty, but misallocation of aid by sanctioned entities prevents it from reaching its target

Adesnik 20

David Adesnik (David Adesnik is a senior fellow and director of research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies), War on the Rocks, "New Sanctions on Assad Aim to Prevent Atrocities - War on the Rocks", June 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/06/new-sanctions-on-assad-aim-to-prevent-atrocities/ -CD

With an estimated 83 percent of Syrians living below the poverty line, there is some hesitation to support any policy, like sanctions, that causes economic disruption. There is also skepticism that sanctions can restrain Assad in a meaningful way, since earlier sanctions have not stopped the regime from killing and torturing hundreds of thousands of its own citizens. Criticism of the Caesar Act, including in a recent War on the Rocks article by Basma Alloush and Alex Simon, is a matter of personal importance to me. My colleagues and I have worked with Caesar for years to put human rights at the center of U.S. foreign policy toward Syria. In that time, I have found the case against sanctions to be consistently unpersuasive. First and foremost, critics of Western sanctions tend to miss the big picture. They focus narrowly on the deprivation they attribute to sanctions, often without also mentioning that Western governments have sent billions of dollars of humanitarian assistance to Syria each year. The U.N. Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs reports that U.N. agencies, funded almost entirely by Western governments, have spent more than $42 billion to address the crisis in Syria since 2012, a figure that includes spending to care for refugees outside the country. The United States has provided $10.6 billion of assistance, including donations to the United Nations for Syria-related work. At first glance, the combination of sanctions and aid may seem like giving with one hand while taking with the other. The essential difference, at least in principle, is that aid directly addresses the need of civilians, while sanctions seek to deprive the regime of revenue it can direct to military offensives, offshore bank accounts, or other undesirable uses. The Assad regime still directs some of its income to food subsidies, yet such programs enrich favored contractors at the expense of the intended beneficiaries. Regrettably, a pliant United Nations has allowed the Assad regime to direct aid flows to supportive regions while denying aid to populations under rebel control. Thus, the international community tolerates the regime’s starvation campaigns, which are an unmistakable war crime. An exhaustive report by The Syria Campaign, a human rights organization, concluded, “The United Nations (UN) in Syria is in serious breach of the humanitarian principles of impartiality, independence and neutrality.” The World Health Organization (WHO) is among the worst offenders under the U.N. umbrella. The pediatrician and public health expert Annie Sparrow has exposed how the WHO frustrated efforts to document the spread of polio, which re-emerged in Syria because the regime prevented the vaccination of children in areas outside its control. As Sparrow documented, the WHO even facilitated the efforts of the Syrian military to evade sanctions that prevented its blood bank from purchasing foreign supplies. The most urgent reform necessary to protect the well-being of Syrian civilians is not a lifting of sanctions, but a root-and-branch reform of the U.N. aid machinery. This would benefit those living under Assad’s control as well as those on the other side of the front lines. While the manipulation of aid inflicts the greatest harm on those living in opposition-held territory, the regime also distributes it in an unequal and politicized manner among those under its control, while corruption claims a sizable share of what the United Nations provides. In hopes of promoting reform, several members of Congress have introduced legislation that would make U.N. reforms a prerequisite for continued American funding of aid programs headquartered in Damascus — in the absence of reform, the bill would redirect funding to aid programs Assad cannot manipulate. So far, the bipartisan coalition responsible for the Caesar Act has not recognized the necessity of this related measure.

#### Sanctions would weaken Assad’s ability to prolong violence in Syria

Adesnik 20

David Adesnik (David Adesnik is a senior fellow and director of research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies), War on the Rocks, "New Sanctions on Assad Aim to Prevent Atrocities - War on the Rocks", June 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/06/new-sanctions-on-assad-aim-to-prevent-atrocities/ -CD

Last December, the president signed into law the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, which congressional leaders embedded in their annual defense authorization bill. The law took effect on June 17. That morning, the U.S. Departments of State and Treasury announced the first tranche of new sanctions. The targets included three Syrian businessmen and six companies that have entered into partnerships with the Assad regime to pursue real estate developments worth tens of millions of dollars. The passage of the Caesar Act entailed an exceptional degree of bipartisan consensus and cooperation at a time of polarization and gridlock. There were few objections in Congress to a program of economic sanctions designed to hold the Assad regime accountable for systematic war crimes for which there is overwhelming and grisly evidence. There is even transatlantic cooperation with regard to imposing sanctions on Syria. Other key aspects of U.S. policy toward Syria remains unsettled. The president has twice ordered the withdrawal of all U.S. troops fighting the Islamic State in northeast Syria, only to reverse himself under intense pressure from lawmakers in his own party. Washington has not articulated the precise nature of America’s objectives in the Levant. Yet preventing Assad and his partners from carrying out further atrocities is clearly one of them. As James Jeffrey and Joel Rayburn — America’s top diplomats working on Syria — noted in a recent briefing, the Caesar Act has the potential to do so by gradually sapping the regime of the resources it needs to mount the military operations against civilians. A coherent policy toward Syria would maximize the impact of tougher sanctions by coordinating the military and diplomatic components of U.S. policy. However, the president’s impulsive decisions have frustrated such efforts. In the meantime, economic pressure can deprive the Syrian government of funds, which in turn limits its ability to launch military offensives that terrorize civilians with indiscriminate bombing, deliberate attacks on hospitals, and other war crimes. Some critics rightly note that part of the cost of sanctions is likely to fall on ordinary Syrians, yet there are other ways to address their needs, such as reforming humanitarian assistance programs. Ultimately, other than sanctions, there is no option on the table that has the potential to stop at least some of Assad’s atrocities. What’s New in the Caesar Act? Previous U.S. sanctions against Syria mainly prohibited American individuals and companies from doing business with the Assad regime and others blacklisted by the Treasury Department. The Caesar Act includes so-called “secondary sanctions” that impose penalties on third-country actors — say Lebanese or Emirati businesses — that transact with those on the blacklist. There is especially strict language regarding activity in the construction and petroleum sectors. In principle, the law does not prohibit doing business with the Syrian private sector, yet the blacklisting of oligarchs close to Assad, whose reach extends throughout the economy, means that almost all sizable firms are off-limits. The Assad regime insists that sanctions amount to “economic terrorism.” On this point, Damascus has the support of Tehran, Moscow, Beijing, and several other dictatorships that share a common interest in delegitimizing coercive human rights policies.