## Topic Overview

* This topic will ask you to discuss the intricacies of plans to guarantee universal childcare in the U.S
* Universal Child Care is the concept that childcare be publicized in a similar way to public school. So, children under school age can get care. This is viewed as most helpful for working families that cannot take care of their children due to work obligations.
* Childcare is expensive and quality varies greatly, some say that publicizing it would ensure quality and take away a large cost to these families.
* The quality of childcare, and where it comes from, is inherently important in the outcomes for children. This is where many of the impacts within this ground will be generated from.
* Opposers of the plan argue that it is a bad social trend and ends up hurting children more, as you will see in the negative case
* Most recently, the Elizabeth Warren bill is the way that this would most likely be passed into action.
* Clash will likely be generated along the lines of feasibility, as this plan is particularly costly and would be incredibly difficult to implement. Negative must call into question the quality, cost, and mechanisms of implementation.
* There are various examples of other countries carrying out similar plans, such as Canada. These examples can provide evidence for many of the claims that will be made.
* Canadian successes and failures will implicate a lot of the direction that these debates go.
* This topic has lots of clear cut offense on both sides, and is balanced in how both teams will be able to engage.

## Extra Readings

<https://www.pri.org/stories/2019-02-05/what-we-can-learn-canada-s-universal-child-care-model>

<https://elizabethwarren.com/plans/universal-child-care>

<https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/2/22/18234606/warren-child-care-universal-2020>

<https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w21571/w21571.pdf?utm_campaign=PANTHEON_STRIPPED&amp%3Butm_medium=PANTHEON_STRIPPED&amp%3Butm_source=PANTHEON_STRIPPED)//LED>

https://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-uncomfortable-truth-about-daycare#:~:text=HONESTY%20IS%20THE%20BEST%20POLICY,to%20take%20care%20of%20them.

## Aff

### Framing

#### The Value is Equality

#### **ACLU ND**

Non-profit defending rights, YOUR RIGHT TO EQUALITY IN EDUCATION, <https://www.aclu.org/other/your-right-equality-education)//LED>

Getting an education isn't just about books and grades - we're also learning how to participate fully in the life of this nation. (We're tomorrow's leaders after all!) But in order to really participate, we need to know our rights - otherwise we may lose them. The highest law in our land is the U.S. Constitution, which has some amendments, known as the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights guarantees that the government can never deprive people in the U.S. of certain fundamental rights including the right to freedom of religion and to free speech and the due process of law. Many federal and state laws give us additional rights, too. The Bill of Rights applies to young people as well as adults. And what I'm going to do right here is tell you about EQUAL TREATMENT. DO ALL KIDS HAVE THE RIGHT TO AN EQUAL EDUCATION? Yes! All kids living in the United States have the right to a free public education. And the Constitution requires that all kids be given equal educational opportunity no matter what their race, ethnic background, religion, or sex, or whether they are rich or poor, citizen or non-citizen. Even if you are in this country illegally, you have the right to go to public school. The ACLU is fighting hard to make sure this right isn't taken away. In addition to this constitutional guarantee of an equal education, many federal, state and local laws also protect students against discrimination in education based on sexual orientation or disability, including pregnancy and HIV status. In fact, even though some kids may complain about having to go to school, the right to an equal educational opportunity is one of the most valuable rights you have. The Supreme Court said this in the landmark Brown v. Board of Education case when it struck down race segregation in the public schools. If you believe you or someone you know is being discriminated against in school, speak up! Talk to a teacher, the principal, the head of a community organization or a lawyer so they can investigate the situation and help you take legal action if necessary. ARE TRACKING SYSTEMS LEGAL? Yes, as long as they really do separate students on the basis of learning ability and as long as they give students the same basic education. Many studies show, however, that the standards and tests school officials use in deciding on track placements are often based on racial and class prejudices and stereotypes instead of on real ability and learning potential. That means it's often the white, middle-class kids who end up in the college prep classes, while poor and non-white students, and kids whose first language isn't English, end up on "slow" tracks and in vocational-training classes. And often, the lower the track you're on, the less you're expected to learn - and the less you're taught. Even if you have low grades or nobody in your family ever went to college, if you want to go to college, you should demand the type of education you need to realize your dreams. And your guidance counselor should help you get it! Your local ACLU can tell you the details of how to go about challenging your track placement.

#### The Criterion an analysis of costs and benefits on a utilitarian scale

#### Util is the best scale Taranovsky 3

Dmytro Taranovsky, MIT Researcher, Utilitarianism, Published by MIT February 7, 2003, <http://web.mit.edu/dmytro/www/Utilitarianism.htm)//LED>

The most important question of all is what should one do since the ultimate purpose of answering questions is either to satisfy curiosity or to decide which action to take. Complicated analysis is often required to answer that question. Beyond ordinary analysis, one must also have a system of values, and the correct system of values is utilitarianism. Utilitarianism is the system of values stating that maximizing the total happiness of all people is good. Happiness of people should be sacrificed only to bring greater happiness to other people. Psychologically, immediate happiness corresponds to what you want. Pain, including psychological distress, is the opposite of happiness. Actual happiness is not the same as apparent happiness: A person experiencing strong physical pleasure may suffer hidden psychological distress; the inner desire of martyrs to do what is right can override obvious physical pain. People do not always do what they want because sacrificing immediate happiness is often best to achieve long-term happiness of themselves and others. Utilitarianism per se does not answer the question of how many people should be created. However, creating too many people will damage the environment and thus impair the long term ability to have large population on Earth. Moreover, it is generally agreed that if the society can allow all people to be prosperous and thriving and that creating extra people will undermine that ability, then extra people should not be created. If you know with certainty what will maximize happiness, you should do that. The problem, of course, is that you (almost) never know the future with certainty. The question of what should one do is a question of how to make decisions. Information that you cannot access cannot impact your decision making and thus does not affect what you should do: Decisions to play a lottery should be based on the odds (which are usually not in your favor) and not on whether, unknowingly to you, your number happens to be a winning one. Thus, a choice of values is a choice of the decision making procedure. As with every other general theory, a naive interpretation of utilitarianism may lead to incorrect results. For example, one may be tempted to steal to transfer money to a more deserving person. However, our economic system can work only if property rights are protected, so the government has a duty to prevent theft. Theft has dangers and negative side effects such as punishment of the thief, distress of the owner, and abridgments of property rights, which are necessary for good economy. Thieves tend to have an inflated opinion of themselves; a decision procedure for theft must account for such inflation. It is for these reasons that theft is generally wrong, and for the same reasons, most societies developed an intuitive disapproval of theft. In another example, a judge may be tempted to misinterpret an unjust law so as to reach the desired result. However, the power of the judiciary is based on their good faith interpretations of the laws. Judicial honesty is essential for the retainment of such power and thus for the compelling benefits of an independent judiciary. Another misinterpretation of utilitarianism is that you have to give away all your money to poor people in third world countries. However, money can be successfully invested, producing more money and thus ability to do greater good. College education, while costly, greatly improves the ability to earn money and thus allows greater contribution to the poor. Moderate comfort, rest, and entertainment improve productivity. Also, idealism can fail; one's determination to do good today does not guarantee doing good tomorrow. Incentives are needed to sustain the determination; rewarding oneself for hard work causes one to work hard and thus do more good. An objection to utilitarianism is the claim that the ultimate goal of utilitarianism can be achieved through a pleasure machine: Every person’s brain is connected to the machine, which sends signals to produce extreme pleasure, while suppressing all feelings but pleasure. However, feelings are meaningless but in the context of understanding. One can assign a high pleasure number to a stone, but the pleasure number is meaningless because the stone cannot understand or contemplate pleasure or anything else. Similarly, happiness can only exist in the presence of intellectual processing and struggle that gives it meaning, and our intuition that such pleasure machine would destroy everything we value is compatible with utilitarianism. Some people argue that utilitarianism is contrary to human rights. The support for human rights is based on our feelings and deep beliefs that human rights are good. These feelings do not arise in a vacuum. They are acquired because, as history repeatedly shows, violations of human rights have horrible consequences. Censorship, more likely than not, prevents indispensible changes in societies that practice it. The benefits of torture are insignificant compared to the suffering it inflicts and the damage to benevolence of the society. Because of fallibility of human nature and the special nature of fundamental rights, abridgements of human rights cause unacceptable danger to the society. For example, allowing the government to conduct a lottery for forcible organ donations would present unacceptable danger for abuse as the government can kill any person by faking the lottery results. It is such abuses in the past, senseless government sponsored murders for alleged public good that cause a subconscious aversion to such lottery. Thus, the utilitarian benefits of human rights coincide with the main reasons why the feelings on human rights have developed. Unlike reliance on feelings, utilitarianism places human rights on a strong logical foundation. The intuitions for human rights are fragile, and many societies lack them; even in the United States today, government sponsored homicide of certain helpless "undesirable" people, i.e. death penalty, is considered acceptable. Moreover, wrong intuitions can create fictitious rights, like the right of parents to beat their children, or, in the past, the right of slave owners to their lawfully acquired property, slaves. Therefore, utilitarianism protects and enhances human rights. The most significant alleged problem of utilitarianism is its rejection of the conventional view of justice: According to utilitarianism, taken per se, the well-being of a murderer is as important as the well-being of the President of the United States. However, the two should not be treated equally: Murderers may be dangerous and so should be confined; it is essential to discourage murder; the position of the President should attract competent candidates, and the well-being of the President is very important for the nation. In most cases, relatives of a murder victim have a burning feeling, which is partially shared by the society, that the murderer must be punished, that justice demands punishment. That feeling usually comes without justification by the relatives of the victim. Instead, it is a protective feeling. Punishment can be very effective in preventing future harm. From evolutionary point of view, the desire to punish for harm is caused by the need to protect from harm. Retribution, which often comes under the name of justice, is highly valued in most cultures because by deterring harm it can be highly beneficial, yet the connection between punishment and protection is sufficiently subtle for many people to view retribution is an end in itself rather than as a means to achieve good. The cases of human rights and justice are illustrative of a general relationship between traditional views and utilitarian ones: Utilitarians look at the reasons that conventional rules of conduct are correct whereas traditionalists take traditional moral values (which are often intuitively true because they have been taught and reinforced by the society since childhood) as correct per se. Conventional moral views do not appear out of nowhere; they appear by evolution and natural selection. The innate, that is genetic, dispositions for views on what is right and wrong are based on what is most likely to cause survival and reproduction in a Stone Age society. It is because of the survival and reproduction value that most people value themselves above all, that high priority is placed on the family, that incest is disapproved, and that retribution is treated as a moral prerogative. Cultures also evolve through natural selection. Cultures with superior (in a certain way) moral values are likely to spread and become dominant because their values cause the people to make choices that are better (in a certain way) than choices made by people of other cultures. Finally, inside a particular culture, morals evolve by natural selection. Moral views that are beneficial (under the relevant metric) become slowly accepted, while harmful moral views are slowly rejected. The inability of natural selection of ethical views to keep pace with societal and technological changes that alter which conduct is most beneficial is one of the major causes of the disagreement of traditional views with utilitarianism; the other is that the selection is for benefit of the individuals and groups, hence traditional views deemphasize helping outsiders but elevate patriotism toward the relevant groups. The main argument for utilitarianism is that happiness is good and that there is no reason for one person's happiness to be more important than anothers and that there is no reason to follow a rule of conduct that is known to be detrimental to the happiness of us all. Ordinary rules of logic (such as modus ponens) do not allow the inference that something should be done without an ethical value as a premise, and hence alone cannot be used to derive basic values. Instead, potential reasons for and against utilitarianism are minimization of unexplainable—the principle that gives validity to the scientific method. A theory of morality that deviates from utilitarianism would leave unexplained the extent that one person's happiness is more important than another's and the level of importance of non-happiness related elements. In a non-utilitarian theory of morality, the precise importance assigned to each of the values is inherently arbitrary, hence utilitarianism is the only non-arbitrary theory of morality. For example, a theory of morality may consider prohibition of theft and protection of human life as basic values, with protection of human life being more important if and only if the amount stolen to save the life is less than $1234.56, the exact amount being purely arbitrary. Thus, minimization of unexplainable compels utilitarianism unless disagreement of traditional beliefs with the correct theory of morality is unexplainable and hence a reason to reject utilitarianism. However, an explanation of traditional moral beliefs is presented above, so the disagreement is fully explainable. Even if the disagreement did not appear explainable, it would not constitute a reason to reject utilitarianism because different cultures and subcultures have contradictory moral views. A society may consider an action to be an obvious wrong while another society considers that action morally obligatory. For example, while some societies view cannibalism as disrespectful of the body of the dead and as such clearly wrong, in other societies humans eat flesh of deceased relatives to help ensure the continuation of the spirit of the deceased. Given a non-utilitarian belief, even one that the society holds sacred, it is at least possible that another society (possibly on a different planet) holds precisely the opposite belief just as sacred, the only universal being that people try to do what they want unless they perceive a reason to do otherwise. If you feel that your unexplainable moral values are true because of divine guidance, then another person probably feels that his unexplainable moral beliefs (contradictory to yours) are also true as they are caused by divine guidance: Examples of contradictory claims of divine guidance abound. The only way to resolve the disagreement is by reasoning about basic moral values independently of the fact that your culture has such and such moral beliefs—and such reasoning leads to utilitarianism. Many traditions and values of the American society are beneficial, but some are harmful. Acceptance of utilitarianism will preserve beneficial traditions while replacing the harmful ones. As a result, new traditions, grounded in reason, will emerge, and future generations may wonder how the irrational and unnatural non-utilitarian values had survived for so long.

### Solvency

#### Childcare is necessary and there is a nuanced plan to implement it

Whitehurst 17

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Most families need childcare. Childcare is expensive and licensed center-based care is unaffordable for families of poor to modest means. There is broad public support for more government spending on childcare as long as that spending does not result in another unfunded entitlement that worsens the deficit. Claims that more spending on childcare will pay back the taxpayer in the long run based on better child development or increased workplace productivity are shaky. Political appetite for more spending on childcare will be greater if a childcare subsidy can be paid for as we go with an offset elsewhere in the federal budget. The federal deduction for charitable contributions is a possible target for such an offset. The plan for increased childhood subsidies outlined in this paper would cost $42 billion and would provide a substantial subsidy for every child from birth to fifth birthday in a family at or below 200 percent of the federal poverty level. This is nearly half the families in the U.S. If current federal spending on childcare and early childhood programs, amounting to about $26 billion a year, were shifted to the new subsidy, $16 billion more would be required. The charitable deduction presently costs the U.S. Treasury $55 billion a year. A $16 billion offset for childcare would allow the proposed childcare subsidy to be budget neutral while leaving $39 billion on the table to continue the charitable deduction or to support various tax reform proposals that are in the works. Most voters want government to spend more money of the care and education of young children, for the good of families and everything that flows from stable homes and supportive environments for children and adults. The policy arguments on this topic have largely been sideshows about research on long term benefits for children; whether it is desirable for government to gain substantial control over the environments in which young children are reared; and roles of the federal vs. state government. The immediate issues are more direct. The evidence shows clearly that many families need childcare and that licensed center-based care is not affordable for them. How can the federal government pay for it, assure that parents remain in the driver’s seat, minimize unintended negative consequences (including overutilization), and achieve requisite political support? The present paper provides one solution in the form of childcare and education savings accounts paid for with redirection of current federal spending on early education and care, and through an offset from the federal deduction for charitable contributions. There are other policy mechanisms that have overlapping goals, including a Trump plan involving tax credits. Now is the time and the opportunity for serious political consideration of new funding and delivery models for childcare. PARENTS NEED CHILDCARE Most young children in the U.S. have parents who work outside the home. Both parents work in 56 percent of married families with children under six. For single mothers raising a young child the employment rate is 65 percent. It is 83 percent for single fathers who are the custodial parent. Childcare is a necessity for these families, which in aggregate constitute 60 percent of families with young children.[1] GOOD CHILDCARE IS UNAFFORDABLE Center-based childcare is very expensive, both in absolute terms and relative to family income. One estimate pegs the average weekly cost of full-time (40 hours per week) daycare at $196 per child, or about $10,000 per year.[2] Other estimates are higher.[3] Costs vary substantially by geographical locale, age of the child, and form of childcare. For example, full-time center-based care for one infant or toddler ranges from about $5,000 a year in Mississippi to over $22,000 a year in Washington, D.C.[4] Costs for infants and toddlers are thousands of dollars higher per year than costs for preschoolers. These costs are very high relative to family income.[5] Accredited, center-based childcare for a dual-earner family with two young children and with earnings at 150 percent of the average full-time worker’s wage would cost that family, on average, 29 percent of their take-home pay. A poor single parent earning 50 percent of the national average wage would have to spend 52 percent of her income for the same services. The U.S. ranks dead last among developed nations on this measure of affordability, as illustrated in the subsequent figure for a single parent earning half the average wage.[6] CCF\_20170309\_Whitehurst\_Evidence\_Speaks\_1 The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services concludes that affordable childcare should not exceed 7 percent of family income. There is only one state in the nation, Louisiana, in which the cost of center-based infant care for one child meets that definition for a married couple with the median income for the state.[7] In other words, childcare of the type and in the settings that experts favor for child development is simply unaffordable for a majority of working families, and a stretch for many others. Parents are acutely sensitive to the costs and stresses of obtaining childcare. A recent national poll found that 61 percent of parents who report that their financial situation is not strong say that the costs of childcare pose for them a financial problem, with about third of those parents indicating that the financial burden is “very serious.”[8] And these results are in the context of parents who have frequently already cheaped out on childcare expenses by using unlicensed providers working out of their homes in the neighborhood. Were these parents forced to spend the national average of $10,000 a year for licensed, regulated center-based care virtually all would experience “very serious” financial burdens. UNAFFORDABLE CHILDCARE HAS NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES There are a range of consequences of the high costs and low affordability of childcare. Among them are deleterious effects on children of unregulated and often substandard childcare;[9] lost productivity for employers due to parents missing work to handle gaps in childcare or to care for a sick child;[10] lost wages and reduced retirement benefits for parents who have to drop out of the labor market to provide at-home care for their young children;[11] a substantial downward pressure on the wages of childcare workers with effects on the quality and stability of the childcare workforce;[12] and lost opportunities for further education,[13] college savings, and other investments that working parents could make in themselves and their children but cannot afford because they are spending most or all of their disposable income on childcare.

#### Removal of charitable contribution funds the aff

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Charitable contributions receive favorable treatment under the U.S. tax code and are expensive to the federal treasury. The tax benefit is structured in ways that many find perverse, both in who gets the deduction and how much value is provided for the general public. And while there are surely categories of federal expenditure that many people would find more attractive targets for redirection into childcare than the charitable deduction, e.g., carried interest, military spending, my goal is to be politically realistic. Let’s start with some background on the charitable deduction and how it works. The charitable deduction falls into a category of revenue losses, so-called tax expenditures, attributable “to provisions of the Federal tax laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability.”[21] Specifically, the charitable deduction allows individual taxpayers and corporations to deduct from their taxable income in a given year the present value of contributions they make to nonprofit groups that are religious, charitable, educational, scientific, or literary in purpose, or that work to prevent cruelty to children or animals. Examples of organizations that qualify as recipients of contributions for the purpose of a tax deduction include non-profit educational institutions such as Harvard University, think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation and the Brookings Institution, hospitals such as St. Jude’s, philanthropies such as the Gates Foundation, and arts organizations such as Lincoln Center. Of course, contributions to small or local organizations without the name recognition of my examples also generate the deduction. THE CHARITABLE DEDUCTION HAS CONDITIONS There are four principal conditions on a taxpayer’s charitable deduction to a qualifying organization. First, the charitable deduction applies to a contribution up to but not exceeding 50 percent of the income of donor. For example, if a prospective donor has two million dollars in taxable income in a given year, that person can receive a tax deduction for donations of up to $1 million. In contrast, if the prospective donor has a taxable income of $20,000 they can only receive a tax deduction for contributions that have value of up to $10,000. An obvious consequence of this rule is that an individual with a large income can receive a deduction on a much larger charitable deduction in absolute terms than can an individual with a small income. Second, the charitable deduction is only available to individuals who itemize their deductions. Only 30 percent of American taxpayers itemize.[22] Thus 70 percent of taxpayers, i.e., those who take the standard deduction, are frozen out of the tax benefits of charitable giving. Because higher income taxpayers are much more likely to itemize than those with lower incomes (e.g., 94 percent of individuals with incomes >$200,000 vs. 21 percent of those with incomes from $25,000 to $50,000), this tilts benefits of the charitable deduction heavily towards the affluent.[23] Third, the value of a charitable gift for the purposes of a tax deduction is its present market value, not how much it cost the donor or its replacement cost. Thus, for example, a donation of clothing to the Salvation Army is valued at the market price of used clothing for the purposes of claiming the charitable deduction, not its purchase price or replacement value. This works against the interest of taxpayers of modest means who make small donations of personal property to charities. In contrast, it is a tremendous boon to wealthy individuals who typically make donations of items with appreciated value, most frequently stocks and bonds. The donor gets the charitable deduction on the present market value of the stock at the time it is donated, not the price at which it was purchased. This provision of the tax code provides a strong incentive for tax payers with high incomes in a particular year to donate stocks that have shown substantial long-term appreciation. Doing so both generates a large tax deduction and avoids what otherwise might be a hefty capital gains tax on the sale of those assets. Finally, the amount of the charitable deduction is based on the donor’s tax rate. The top marginal income tax rate for 2017 is roughly 40 percent for single filers with taxable income of $419,000 or greater. In contrast, the tax bracket for an individual with $30,000 of income is 15 percent. The low-income individual who gives $1,000 to his church and itemizes gets a federal incentive in the form of a $150 tax deduction for doing so, whereas the high-income individual who gives the same amount to his church gets a $400 tax deduction. The wealthy person gets over 2.5 times the match from the federal treasury as the poor person for exactly the same gift.

### Contention

#### **There is an inherent problem in the U.S**

Warren 19

Elizabeth Warren, an American politician and former law professor who is the senior United States senator from Massachusetts, My plan for Universal Child Care, Published by Medium 2/19/20, <https://medium.com/@teamwarren/my-plan-for-universal-child-care-762535e6c20a)//LED>

Finding affordable and high-quality child care has gotten even harder since my children were growing up — and not everyone is lucky enough to have an Aunt Bee of their own. Today, in more than half the states in the country, a year of child care costs more than a year of in-state college tuition. We’re placing a huge financial burden on working families looking to find a safe and nurturing place for their kids. We’re also missing out on the opportunity to provide all our kids with high-quality early education — education that pays off in all sorts of ways for the rest of their lives. Research has shown that early education promotes cognitive skills, attentiveness, motivation, sociability, and self-control — the kinds of skills that result in children leading happier, healthier, and more productive lives as adults. We must do better for our kids — and our parents. In the wealthiest country on the planet, access to affordable and high-quality child care and early education should be a right, not a privilege reserved for the rich. That’s why I’m proposing a bold new Universal Child Care and Early Learning plan. My plan will guarantee high-quality child care and early education for every child in America from birth to school age. It will be free for millions of American families, and affordable for everyone. This is the kind of big, structural change we need to produce an economy that works for everyone. High-quality child care is expensive — and hard to find There are two big problems with child care in America: it’s hard to find high-quality care, and where you do find it, that care is extraordinarily expensive. Today, more than half of all Americans live in child care “deserts” — communities without an adequate number of licensed child care options. An even higher percentage of Latino families and families in rural areas live in child care deserts. And child care costs are painfully high. The average cost of child care for a single child can take up between 9% to 36% of a family’s total income. Those percentages only grow bigger for families with multiple children. And for single parents, the costs can be even more overwhelming: nationally, the cost of center-based infant care can take up between 27% to 91% of the average income of a single parent. The difficulty of accessing affordable and high-quality child care puts parents in a bind — forcing them to choose between breaking the budget, cutting back work hours, or settling for lower-quality care. The financial squeeze is so severe that it’s even deterring families from having kids at all. The high cost of child care is the number one reason people give for having fewer children than they’d like. The lack of affordable early learning options also shortchanges our kids. Research from Nobel Prize-winning economist James Heckman shows that high-quality early education can improve high school graduation rates and employment income, and reduce health risks like drug use and high blood pressure. It’s also a great investment — every dollar spent on quality early education has been found to save seven dollars in the long run.

#### **Legislation in place to provide structural change**

Warren 19

Elizabeth Warren, an American politician and former law professor who is the senior United States senator from Massachusetts, My plan for Universal Child Care, Published by Medium 2/19/20, <https://medium.com/@teamwarren/my-plan-for-universal-child-care-762535e6c20a)//LED>

My plan provides the kind of big, structural change we need transform child care from a privilege for the wealthy to a right for every child in America. Here’s how it works: The federal government will partner with local providers — states, cities, school districts, nonprofits, tribes, faith-based organizations — to create a network of child care options that would be available to every family. These options would include locally-licensed child care centers, preschool centers, and in-home child care options. Local communities would be in charge, but providers would be held to high national standards to make sure that no matter where you live, your child will have access to quality care and early learning. Child care and preschool workers will be doing the educational work that teachers do, so they will be paid like comparable public school teachers. And here’s the best part. The federal government will pick up a huge chunk of the cost of operating these new high-quality options. That allows local providers to provide access for free to any family that makes less than 200% of the federal poverty line. That means free coverage for millions of children. Robust federal funding also allows local providers to provide access to any family over that 200% threshold at very affordable rates that are capped at no more than 7% of that family’s income. That’s a heck of a lot less than what most families are paying for high-quality child care now. This approach builds on two successful programs. Like Head Start, my plan requires the federal government to work with local partners to fit the specific needs of the community and ensures that child care providers offer early learning services. And like the universal child care program the U.S. military currently offers — which provides child care for more than 200,000 children of military families — care will be free or affordable for all families, and will provide accredited child care options with well-paid and qualified child care workers.

#### Leads to better outcomes

Whitehurst 17

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Empirically grounded arguments can be made about economic returns to larger childcare subsidies that rely not on what children learn in preschool that might make them more successful in later life but on the impact on parents and all children in a family of the family having more disposable income as a result of having to pay less for childcare. Lower-income families need more money, and they do better when they receive it.[19] There are also substantial costs to employers related to employee absences and turnover caused by childcare breakdowns that would be reduced with increased childcare subsidies.[20] There is not, however, a strong empirical basis for estimating these costs, how much they would be reduced through an expanded childcare subsidy, and what effects this would have on tax revenues. To hold that increased spending on childcare will pay for itself through such savings is as wishful a speculation as the one that depends on the assumption that childcare produces better children who later become more productive adults. A large new public expenditure on childcare would have significant negative effects on the federal budget in the near term. The call for many billions of new dollars of annually recurring federal expenditure on expanded support for childcare that is supposed to pay for itself way down the road is politically unrealistic.

#### **Good for the economy**

Warren 19

Elizabeth Warren, an American politician and former law professor who is the senior United States senator from Massachusetts, My plan for Universal Child Care, Published by Medium 2/19/20, <https://medium.com/@teamwarren/my-plan-for-universal-child-care-762535e6c20a)//LED>

My Universal Child Care and Early Learning program is a win-win-win: it’s great for parents, for kids, and for the economy. Parents get the security of knowing there are affordable and instructional child care options for their children. That gives them the freedom to choose the best work and child care situation for themselves. Kids get high-quality early learning opportunities that put them on track to fulfill their potential. Study after study has shown that regular access to high-quality child care promotes literacy skills, cognitive development, and healthy behaviors. These are long-term benefits: quality early education produces better health, educational, and employment outcomes well into adulthood. My plan gives every kid a fair shot. And the economy gets a huge boost. More than a million child-care workers will get higher wages and more money to spend. More parents can work more hours if they choose to, producing stronger economic growth. And a generation of kids will get the early instruction they need to be healthier and more productive members of society after high school and beyond. My Universal Child Care and Early Learning plan is the kind of transformative change we need to make the American economy work for everyone.

#### Positive economic movement

McGrew 18

Will McGrew is a former Research Assistant at the Washington Center for Equitable Growth, Universal childcare’s benefits might cover much of its costs, Published by WSEG AUGUST 13, 2018, <https://equitablegrowth.org/universal-childcares-benefits-might-cover-much-of-its-costs/)//LED>

Several decades of research in economics and psychology show that childcare boasts substantial positive effects on human capital development and labor market outcomes—for both parents and kids. A critical question for policymakers, then, is how these benefits affect the net fiscal impact of a publicly financed, comprehensive childcare system that ensures access for all families in the United States. A new study on Norway’s universal childcare program sheds light on at least one way in which such a program’s benefits might cover part of its costs. With the goal of making quality, affordable childcare available to all children, a bipartisan reform enacted by the Norwegian Parliament in 2002 dramatically increased state subsidies for childcare enrollment, lowered parental fees, and upped public investment in the construction of new childcare facilities. Exploiting differences between municipalities in the rate of childcare expansion in the aftermath of this reform, authors Martin Eckhoff Andresen, research economist at Statistics Norway, and Tarjei Havnes, associate professor of economics at the University of Oslo, estimate the effects of childcare use on labor supply, earnings, and tax payments for parents of 2-year-old children. Disaggregating the effects of the expansion in childcare availability on mothers by relationship status, Andresen and Havnes find large and statistically significant labor-supply responses for all mothers. Specifically, three co-habiting or married mothers entered the labor force—largely into full-time employment—for every 10 2-year-old kids enrolled in childcare. The results for single mothers were somewhat weaker: One single mother entered part-time employment for every five toddlers enrolled in childcare. These effects translated into higher annual earnings for mothers. On average, co-habiting and married mothers saw their wages increase by $6,000, and single mothers saw their wages increase by $2,400. In contrast to the strong impact on maternal labor supply and earnings, the expansion of childcare had little empirical effect on fathers. This nonresult probably reflects persistent social norms that assign mothers a disproportionate responsibility for child rearing, particularly when children are toddlers.

#### Empirically boosts economic output-Norway Proves

McGrew 18

Will McGrew is a former Research Assistant at the Washington Center for Equitable Growth, Universal childcare’s benefits might cover much of its costs, Published by WSEG AUGUST 13, 2018, https://equitablegrowth.org/universal-childcares-benefits-might-cover-much-of-its-costs/)//LED

Andresen and Havnes use their labor supply and earnings estimates to calculate the fiscal impact of Norway’s universal childcare program. Specifically, the authors find that at least 13 percent of the cost of expanding childcare for co-habiting mothers is offset by increased tax revenue generated through the additional employment of mothers in the 2 years following the program’s expansion. Additionally, the authors argue that the actual responses and budgetary savings may in fact be larger than their estimates, as initial take-up of public formal childcare may be incomplete. In conjunction with other recent empirical studies, Andresen and Havnes’s findings provide suggestive evidence that the fiscal impact of universal childcare may grow stronger over time. Their data show that the increase in mothers’ attachment to the labor market persists and remains significant for at least 4 years following the parliamentary expansion. According to contemporary research into the gender wage gap, this increase in long-run labor force participation should allow mothers’ wages to avoid the wage penalties associated with prolonged absences from the labor force and instead increase gradually over time. The authors argue that as a result of these labor market changes, expanding access to childcare in Norway produced an enduring increase in the nation’s tax base. While the social welfare system, childcare infrastructure, and tax system in Norway are different than those in the United States, there is nevertheless strong reason to believe that childcare expansion might have similar (if not larger) impacts in the U.S. context. First, the results of this study are consistent with others conducted in Quebec, Spain, Belgium, and elsewhere, which also found boosts in mother’s labor supply and government tax revenue from universal childcare. Additionally, Andresen and Havnes’s findings are similar to those in several other studies conducted in the United States, which verify positive effects on mothers’ employment from public childcare subsidies. Finally, in the context of the United States, where both childcare access and women’s labor force participation levels are significantly lower than those in Norway, there may even be more room to increase women’s labor force participation and wages, thereby driving up tax revenues over the long-term despite potentially larger short-term costs due to more robust uptake. In the United States today, the underprovision of childcare services has substantial negative effects, depressing earnings and labor force participation for parents and driving suboptimal social and economic outcomes for children. Andresen and Havnes’s new paper illustrates that expanded childcare may come with substantial positive effects both for parents’ employment and aggregate tax revenues. Beyond these effects on parents, research documents that childcare expansion can also produce dramatic improvements in children’s health, cognitive and social skills, educational outcomes, and labor market opportunities. In light of Andresen and Havnes’s findings, the implications of these improved outcomes for aggregate economic growth and additional tax revenues in the United States could be an exciting topic for future empirical research.

#### Unaffordable healthcare has massive impacts

Whitehurst 17

Grover J. “Russ” Whitehurst, Grover J. "Russ" Whitehurst is a former Senior Fellow in the Center on Children and Families in the Economic Studies program at the Brookings Institution, where he was the editor of the Evidence Speaks series, Why the federal government should subsidize childcare and how to pay for it, https://www.brookings.edu/research/why-the-federal-government-should-subsidize-childcare-and-how-to-pay-for-it/)//LED

There are a range of consequences of the high costs and low affordability of childcare. Among them are deleterious effects on children of unregulated and often substandard childcare;[9] lost productivity for employers due to parents missing work to handle gaps in childcare or to care for a sick child;[10] lost wages and reduced retirement benefits for parents who have to drop out of the labor market to provide at-home care for their young children;[11] a substantial downward pressure on the wages of childcare workers with effects on the quality and stability of the childcare workforce;[12] and lost opportunities for further education,[13] college savings, and other investments that working parents could make in themselves and their children but cannot afford because they are spending most or all of their disposable income on childcare. THE PUBLIC SUPPORTS MORE SPENDING ON EARLY CHILDHOOD IF IT DOESN’T INCREASE THE DEFICIT That so many adults have faced, are facing, or will face the challenges of obtaining affordable, reliable childcare is probably one reason that national polls routinely find overwhelming public support for increasing federal and state spending on early childhood programs for low- and moderate-income families. Note, however, that voters condition their support on such expenditures paying for themselves in the long-term and not permanently adding to the federal deficit.[14] Let’s call this the “must-be-paid-for” stipulation.

### Extensions

#### Plan needed now, costs skyrocketing and not enough access

Covert 18

Bryce Covert is a contributing writer at The New York Times and also writes for the The New Republic, The Nation, and other outlets, A New Deal for Day Care, Published by New Republic 5/1/28, <https://newrepublic.com/article/147802/new-deal-day-care-america-change-care-kids)//LED>

Most Americans have long considered child care to be a personal problem rather than a collective one. But times have changed. Today, nearly eight million families pay nannies, day care centers, or some other provider to watch over their children, according to census data. This shift, from parental to professional care, has not been a happy one economically: Annual costs can easily reach tens of thousands of dollars, outpacing what families typically spend on food and, in many states, housing or even public college tuition. In Massachusetts, for example, where child care costs are some of the highest in the country, a parent with an infant spends an average of $20,125 each year on day care; freshman-year tuition at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, runs only $14,596. The expense doesn’t necessarily result in good care: Fewer than 10 percent of day care centers, according to a 2006 survey, have well-trained and well-educated providers, who read books aloud to children, respond to them, ask questions, and encourage their development. That’s for the parents who can even get professional child care. Large stretches of the United States are considered “child care deserts,” where day care centers either don’t exist at all or are in such demand that there are more than three times as many kids as available spots. Take Minnesota, a state with one of the most intense child care shortages in the country; in the Twin Cities, more than a million people live in one of these deserts—roughly two-thirds of the population. It’s even worse in the state’s rural areas: The numbers reach as high as 84 percent. Across Minnesota, there are more than four children for every available day care center slot. Fifty years ago, this situation would have essentially been unthinkable: In 1970, about half of all American mothers stayed home to care for their children. But today, the vast majority of parents, men and women, want to work outside the home; yet too often they can’t—because they can’t afford care for their children. In 2016, nearly two million parents with kids age five and younger had to quit, turn down a job, or significantly change their work because of child care problems. Women are often the hardest hit. Since the 1980s, as child care costs have climbed 70 percent, working mothers’ labor force participation rate has declined 13 percent.

Europe provides model

Covert 18

Bryce Covert is a contributing writer at The New York Times and also writes for the The New Republic, The Nation, and other outlets, A New Deal for Day Care, Published by New Republic 5/1/28, <https://newrepublic.com/article/147802/new-deal-day-care-america-change-care-kids)//LED>

The extent of the economic damage has forced politicians from both parties to alter their views of child care. Within the last five years, some Republicans, who have typically hewed to traditional ideas about families and households, have adopted more modern ideas about how to help parents find care for their children: During the presidential campaign, Donald Trump put forward a plan that he said would tackle the high cost of child care via a tax deduction. Rand Paul and Marco Rubio have also called for expanding tax breaks to help with the price parents pay. But a tax deduction is a very long way from a comprehensive solution, given the cost and the struggle to find adequate care. There is a growing willingness to address the problem, though, which leaves Democrats with an opening to put forward something better. But in September, when the party unveiled the child care plank of its “Better Deal” agenda, it consisted of a punishing maze of technical details. To qualify, a parent would first have to look up her state’s median income—about $80,000 in Maryland; less than $42,000 in Mississippi—and then calculate 150 percent of that number. If she fell below the threshold, she would be asked to put 7 percent of her annual income toward child care. If she made it past the technicalities, she might realize it wasn’t all that much better a deal, either: Democrats ended up excluding parents who make too much to qualify or can’t afford their share of the cost, keeping down the total price tag but failing middle-class families that need help. In Maryland, for example, a single mother who qualifies for help would still pay more than $5,500 a year; if her income were above the cutoff, she’d get nothing at all. Lawmakers could instead institute a system that would make high-quality child care available to all American families, for the entire working day, at a price that they could actually afford. Fanciful as that may sound, this basic standard already exists in many developed countries. In France, parents can take advantage of a network of government-run day cares when their children turn three months old. The centers are open most of the workday and charge based on a sliding scale that corresponds to parental income. France also requires at least half of its providers to have a degree in early education. Once children reach age three, they’re guaranteed a spot in the country’s universal preschool program until the age of six, and more than 95 percent of kids are enrolled. In other words, French parents are all but guaranteed to find a quality, affordable place for their kids while they work. The United States spends less on child care and early childhood education than all other developed countries except Turkey, Latvia, and Croatia. To ensure this kind of care, France spent about 27 billion euros, or just over $33 billion, in 2013—about 1.3 percent of its GDP. We remain embarrassingly far behind; the United States spends less on child care and early childhood education than all other developed countries except Turkey, Latvia, and Croatia. These disparities are well-known. What is less well-known is that U.S. lawmakers don’t have to look to Europe for a workable child care system—an American model already exists. During World War II, as women went to work in factories, President Franklin D. Roosevelt built a nationwide network of public child care centers. They were open 12 hours a day, year-round, at a cost of just about $10 a day in today’s dollars, regardless of income. Every state but New Mexico had them.

Programs successful

Covert 18

Bryce Covert is a contributing writer at The New York Times and also writes for the The New Republic, The Nation, and other outlets, A New Deal for Day Care, Published by New Republic 5/1/28, <https://newrepublic.com/article/147802/new-deal-day-care-america-change-care-kids)//LED>

They were highly successful. For each additional $100 a state spent on centers, children who were enrolled later saw a 1.8 percentage point increase in earnings and a 0.7 percent increase in their employment rate. Other research found that for every three years boys were enrolled, they earned 6 percent more by the age of 60 and were significantly more likely to have graduated from college. The centers also helped mothers. Each dollar in spending meant they could work more and longer hours, bringing home more money. And they loved it. In exit interviews in California, women gave the centers a nearly 100 percent satisfaction rating. But despite pleas from parents and advocates, President Truman shuttered them when the war ended. The country nearly enacted a similar program in 1971, but then special assistant Pat Buchanan helped author President Richard Nixon’s scathing veto of bipartisan legislation, calling a child care bill “truly a long leap into the dark for the United States Government and the American people.” It was communism, Nixon said, and it would destroy families. That vitriol politicized the idea of day care, poisoning the debate for decades. When Barack Obama floated the idea of universal preschool in 2013, House Speaker John Boehner said getting the government involved was “a good way to screw it up.” Three years later, the Republican Party platform committee initially included language explicitly opposing universal child care because it “inserts the state in the family relationship in the very early stages of a child’s life.” This language feels deeply outdated today. The model of a working father and a stay-at-home mother who cares for their children has largely disappeared, falling from 46 percent of families in 1970 to about a quarter in 2015. The day care panic of the 1980s and ’90s—when parents fretted over satanic rituals at centers (at the McMartin family’s Manhattan Beach, California, preschool, operators were accused of not just sexual abuse but also witchcraft, in a widely viewed trial that lasted seven years in the 1980s), and the media debated the impact that a working mother might have on her child’s psyche—has vanished with it, replaced by a national consensus that high-quality care at early ages yields significant benefits for children. Nearly 90 percent of voters—both Republicans and Democrats—support quality, affordable care for young children, according to the bipartisan advocacy group the First Five Years Fund. There are many proposals for how to provide that care, but a universal program would be the most effective and durable. Social Security was designed so that every American had to pay in and every American got a check when they retired. That system is now so entrenched it is almost sacrosanct, despite continual efforts by Republicans to “reform” it out of existence. More broadly, Social Security showed what good government could do and how efficient it could be. A targeted, technocratic program, of the sort proposed in the Better Deal, is in danger of falling prey to stereotypes about failed Big Government—digging up documents to prove that you’re eligible, going to appointments to argue you should stay enrolled, repeating the whole process annually or even monthly. Such bureaucracy discourages people from signing up in the first place and breeds resentment from those just above the cutoff. A child care program for everyone isn’t just a smart investment in parents, children, and our economy, it’s the smartest way to deliver it.

## Neg

### Framing

#### The Value is quality of life

IESE Insight 13

IESE Business School's global experts network, Quality Of Life: Everyone Wants It, But What Is It?, Published by Forbes Sep 4, 2013, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/iese/2013/09/04/quality-of-life-everyone-wants-it-but-what-is-it/?sh=41b1aa93635d)//LED>

"Quality of life" has quickly become a catch-all term, but confusion over what it actually means could have serious negative consequences according to some recent research. Once a term largely used by health-care professionals; now everyone from economists and advertising executives care about offering good “quality of life.” But what does it mean, and how can businesses, as well as physicians, help to improve it, if nobody can clearly define what it is? In an article for Europe's Journal of Psychology, IESE's Marta Elvira, alongside other authors[1], tries to pin down this elusive concept. A Matter of Life and Death As medical advances have helped to increase longevity, our focus has shifted from the quantity to the quality of life. While scientists may resort to rating scales to measure pain, or scoring systems to quantify disabilities, the authors believe that trying to measure "quality of life" this way may be going too far. "Quality of life" is subjective and multidimensional, encompassing positive and negative features of life. It's a dynamic condition that responds to life events: A job loss, illness or other upheavals can change one's definition of "quality of life" rather quickly and dramatically. PROMOTED Google Cloud BRANDVOICE | Paid Program What Is True Resilience? (Hint: It’s Not About Managing Risk) Zoom FORBES INSIGHTS | Paid Program The Distributed Workforce: A Q&A With Zoom’s Global CIO SurveyMonkey BRANDVOICE | Paid Program SurveyMonkey BrandVoice: Throwing Out The Playbook: How A Wild Week On Wall Street Made Us Question Everything Even though measuring it is difficult, clarity is extremely important, especially for medical practitioners, who often take "quality of life" into account when considering whether life-sustaining medical intervention should be withheld for severely disabled or ill patients. As such, coming up with a distinct definition is ethically important, and not just a case of splitting hairs. The Search for a Definition An analysis of scientific papers over the past 20 years shows that a precise, clear and shared definition is a long way off. Often researchers don't even attempt to define the concept, using it instead as an indicator. Among the observations made about "quality of life" is that it encompasses: life satisfaction, which is subjective and may fluctuate. multidimensional factors that include everything from physical health, psychological state, level of independence, family, education, wealth, religious beliefs, a sense of optimism, local services and transport, employment, social relationships, housing and the environment. cultural perspectives, values, personal expectations and goals of what we want from life. not just the absence of disease but the presence of physical, mental and social well-being. The authors stress the need for multidisciplinary medical teams who can develop a perspective on psychosocial needs and not just physical care. our interpretation of facts and events, which helps to explain why some disabled people can report an excellent "quality of life" while others can't. our level of acceptance of our current condition, and our ability to regulate negative thoughts and emotions about that condition. Subjectivity appears to be fundamental to our understanding of "quality of life." The authors also urge that other variables not strictly related to physical health, such as spiritual and social health, should be assessed in the future. As it stands, the confusion over what "quality of life" means does little to help professionals in any field, and could have serious ethical consequences.

#### The Criterion an analysis of costs and benefits on a utilitarian scale

#### Util is the best scale Taranovsky 3

Dmytro Taranovsky, MIT Researcher, Utilitarianism, Published by MIT February 7, 2003, <http://web.mit.edu/dmytro/www/Utilitarianism.htm)//LED>

The most important question of all is what should one do since the ultimate purpose of answering questions is either to satisfy curiosity or to decide which action to take. Complicated analysis is often required to answer that question. Beyond ordinary analysis, one must also have a system of values, and the correct system of values is utilitarianism. Utilitarianism is the system of values stating that maximizing the total happiness of all people is good. Happiness of people should be sacrificed only to bring greater happiness to other people. Psychologically, immediate happiness corresponds to what you want. Pain, including psychological distress, is the opposite of happiness. Actual happiness is not the same as apparent happiness: A person experiencing strong physical pleasure may suffer hidden psychological distress; the inner desire of martyrs to do what is right can override obvious physical pain. People do not always do what they want because sacrificing immediate happiness is often best to achieve long-term happiness of themselves and others. Utilitarianism per se does not answer the question of how many people should be created. However, creating too many people will damage the environment and thus impair the long term ability to have large population on Earth. Moreover, it is generally agreed that if the society can allow all people to be prosperous and thriving and that creating extra people will undermine that ability, then extra people should not be created. If you know with certainty what will maximize happiness, you should do that. The problem, of course, is that you (almost) never know the future with certainty. The question of what should one do is a question of how to make decisions. Information that you cannot access cannot impact your decision making and thus does not affect what you should do: Decisions to play a lottery should be based on the odds (which are usually not in your favor) and not on whether, unknowingly to you, your number happens to be a winning one. Thus, a choice of values is a choice of the decision making procedure. As with every other general theory, a naive interpretation of utilitarianism may lead to incorrect results. For example, one may be tempted to steal to transfer money to a more deserving person. However, our economic system can work only if property rights are protected, so the government has a duty to prevent theft. Theft has dangers and negative side effects such as punishment of the thief, distress of the owner, and abridgments of property rights, which are necessary for good economy. Thieves tend to have an inflated opinion of themselves; a decision procedure for theft must account for such inflation. It is for these reasons that theft is generally wrong, and for the same reasons, most societies developed an intuitive disapproval of theft. In another example, a judge may be tempted to misinterpret an unjust law so as to reach the desired result. However, the power of the judiciary is based on their good faith interpretations of the laws. Judicial honesty is essential for the retainment of such power and thus for the compelling benefits of an independent judiciary. Another misinterpretation of utilitarianism is that you have to give away all your money to poor people in third world countries. However, money can be successfully invested, producing more money and thus ability to do greater good. College education, while costly, greatly improves the ability to earn money and thus allows greater contribution to the poor. Moderate comfort, rest, and entertainment improve productivity. Also, idealism can fail; one's determination to do good today does not guarantee doing good tomorrow. Incentives are needed to sustain the determination; rewarding oneself for hard work causes one to work hard and thus do more good. An objection to utilitarianism is the claim that the ultimate goal of utilitarianism can be achieved through a pleasure machine: Every person’s brain is connected to the machine, which sends signals to produce extreme pleasure, while suppressing all feelings but pleasure. However, feelings are meaningless but in the context of understanding. One can assign a high pleasure number to a stone, but the pleasure number is meaningless because the stone cannot understand or contemplate pleasure or anything else. Similarly, happiness can only exist in the presence of intellectual processing and struggle that gives it meaning, and our intuition that such pleasure machine would destroy everything we value is compatible with utilitarianism. Some people argue that utilitarianism is contrary to human rights. The support for human rights is based on our feelings and deep beliefs that human rights are good. These feelings do not arise in a vacuum. They are acquired because, as history repeatedly shows, violations of human rights have horrible consequences. Censorship, more likely than not, prevents indispensible changes in societies that practice it. The benefits of torture are insignificant compared to the suffering it inflicts and the damage to benevolence of the society. Because of fallibility of human nature and the special nature of fundamental rights, abridgements of human rights cause unacceptable danger to the society. For example, allowing the government to conduct a lottery for forcible organ donations would present unacceptable danger for abuse as the government can kill any person by faking the lottery results. It is such abuses in the past, senseless government sponsored murders for alleged public good that cause a subconscious aversion to such lottery. Thus, the utilitarian benefits of human rights coincide with the main reasons why the feelings on human rights have developed. Unlike reliance on feelings, utilitarianism places human rights on a strong logical foundation. The intuitions for human rights are fragile, and many societies lack them; even in the United States today, government sponsored homicide of certain helpless "undesirable" people, i.e. death penalty, is considered acceptable. Moreover, wrong intuitions can create fictitious rights, like the right of parents to beat their children, or, in the past, the right of slave owners to their lawfully acquired property, slaves. Therefore, utilitarianism protects and enhances human rights. The most significant alleged problem of utilitarianism is its rejection of the conventional view of justice: According to utilitarianism, taken per se, the well-being of a murderer is as important as the well-being of the President of the United States. However, the two should not be treated equally: Murderers may be dangerous and so should be confined; it is essential to discourage murder; the position of the President should attract competent candidates, and the well-being of the President is very important for the nation. In most cases, relatives of a murder victim have a burning feeling, which is partially shared by the society, that the murderer must be punished, that justice demands punishment. That feeling usually comes without justification by the relatives of the victim. Instead, it is a protective feeling. Punishment can be very effective in preventing future harm. From evolutionary point of view, the desire to punish for harm is caused by the need to protect from harm. Retribution, which often comes under the name of justice, is highly valued in most cultures because by deterring harm it can be highly beneficial, yet the connection between punishment and protection is sufficiently subtle for many people to view retribution is an end in itself rather than as a means to achieve good. The cases of human rights and justice are illustrative of a general relationship between traditional views and utilitarian ones: Utilitarians look at the reasons that conventional rules of conduct are correct whereas traditionalists take traditional moral values (which are often intuitively true because they have been taught and reinforced by the society since childhood) as correct per se. Conventional moral views do not appear out of nowhere; they appear by evolution and natural selection. The innate, that is genetic, dispositions for views on what is right and wrong are based on what is most likely to cause survival and reproduction in a Stone Age society. It is because of the survival and reproduction value that most people value themselves above all, that high priority is placed on the family, that incest is disapproved, and that retribution is treated as a moral prerogative. Cultures also evolve through natural selection. Cultures with superior (in a certain way) moral values are likely to spread and become dominant because their values cause the people to make choices that are better (in a certain way) than choices made by people of other cultures. Finally, inside a particular culture, morals evolve by natural selection. Moral views that are beneficial (under the relevant metric) become slowly accepted, while harmful moral views are slowly rejected. The inability of natural selection of ethical views to keep pace with societal and technological changes that alter which conduct is most beneficial is one of the major causes of the disagreement of traditional views with utilitarianism; the other is that the selection is for benefit of the individuals and groups, hence traditional views deemphasize helping outsiders but elevate patriotism toward the relevant groups. The main argument for utilitarianism is that happiness is good and that there is no reason for one person's happiness to be more important than anothers and that there is no reason to follow a rule of conduct that is known to be detrimental to the happiness of us all. Ordinary rules of logic (such as modus ponens) do not allow the inference that something should be done without an ethical value as a premise, and hence alone cannot be used to derive basic values. Instead, potential reasons for and against utilitarianism are minimization of unexplainable—the principle that gives validity to the scientific method. A theory of morality that deviates from utilitarianism would leave unexplained the extent that one person's happiness is more important than another's and the level of importance of non-happiness related elements. In a non-utilitarian theory of morality, the precise importance assigned to each of the values is inherently arbitrary, hence utilitarianism is the only non-arbitrary theory of morality. For example, a theory of morality may consider prohibition of theft and protection of human life as basic values, with protection of human life being more important if and only if the amount stolen to save the life is less than $1234.56, the exact amount being purely arbitrary. Thus, minimization of unexplainable compels utilitarianism unless disagreement of traditional beliefs with the correct theory of morality is unexplainable and hence a reason to reject utilitarianism. However, an explanation of traditional moral beliefs is presented above, so the disagreement is fully explainable. Even if the disagreement did not appear explainable, it would not constitute a reason to reject utilitarianism because different cultures and subcultures have contradictory moral views. A society may consider an action to be an obvious wrong while another society considers that action morally obligatory. For example, while some societies view cannibalism as disrespectful of the body of the dead and as such clearly wrong, in other societies humans eat flesh of deceased relatives to help ensure the continuation of the spirit of the deceased. Given a non-utilitarian belief, even one that the society holds sacred, it is at least possible that another society (possibly on a different planet) holds precisely the opposite belief just as sacred, the only universal being that people try to do what they want unless they perceive a reason to do otherwise. If you feel that your unexplainable moral values are true because of divine guidance, then another person probably feels that his unexplainable moral beliefs (contradictory to yours) are also true as they are caused by divine guidance: Examples of contradictory claims of divine guidance abound. The only way to resolve the disagreement is by reasoning about basic moral values independently of the fact that your culture has such and such moral beliefs—and such reasoning leads to utilitarianism. Many traditions and values of the American society are beneficial, but some are harmful. Acceptance of utilitarianism will preserve beneficial traditions while replacing the harmful ones. As a result, new traditions, grounded in reason, will emerge, and future generations may wonder how the irrational and unnatural non-utilitarian values had survived for so long.

### Contention

#### The underlying focus of child care should be advancing non-cognitive abilities, this is the most accurate link to outcomes

Baker et al 15

Michael Baker Research Associate University of Toronto, Jonathan Gruber Research Associate Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Kevin S. Milligan Affiliate (On leave) University of British Columbia, NON-COGNITIVE DEFICITS AND YOUNG ADULT OUTCOMES: THE LONG-RUN IMPACTS OF A UNIVERSAL CHILD CARE PROGRAM, Published by NBER September 2015, <https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w21571/w21571.pdf?utm_campaign=PANTHEON_STRIPPED&amp%3Butm_medium=PANTHEON_STRIPPED&amp%3Butm_source=PANTHEON_STRIPPED)//LED>

Recent advances in the study of early childhood development have emphasized the role of non-cognitive skills in fostering later-life success (e.g., Heckman and Mosso 2014). Traits such as perseverance and industriousness are viewed as equally important to cognitive skills for better adult outcomes. In contrast, non-cognitive attributes such as impulsiveness and emotional instability are associated with poorer outcomes at older ages. For example, Bertrand and Pan (2013) examine how childhood non-cognitive deficits account for the gender difference in teenage disruptive behavior. Particularly striking evidence on this point comes from experimental or quasiexperimental studies finding interventions improving non-cognitive skills—while having little persistent effect on cognitive ability—lead to improved long run outcomes. Experimental preschool interventions such as the Perry Preschool program provide a useful example. As reviewed by Heckman et al. (2013), the Perry Preschool program had no lasting measurable cognitive benefit, with any improvement in test performance fading out during the school years. Yet there were enormous long run benefits of the program in terms of improved economic outcomes and a lower incidence of criminal behavior, such that the annualized measured rate of return to this investment is 6-10%. Heckman et al. (2013) document an association of the Perry program with dramatic and lasting improvements in non-cognitive skills. This evidence is also consistent with evaluations of the Head Start program in the United States. A number of studies, including a recent experimental evaluation, have found that cognitive gains from this program fade out during the school years (e.g. Bitler et al., 2014). Yet quasi-experimental studies have found sizeable long run benefits from Head Start program 2 participation. Carneiro and Ginja (2014) use a regression discontinuity design around program eligibility rules to show that Head Start participation reduces behavior problems and obesity at ages 12-13, and reduces depression, obesity, and criminality for those ages 16-17. These findings raise an important question of symmetry: are there equally persistent and important negative long-run impacts of interventions that foster a deterioration in noncognitive skills?

Quebec study show universal child care is bad for this

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We do, however, find a significant worsening in self-reported health and in life satisfaction among teens. Most strikingly, we find a sharp and contemporaneous increase in criminal behavior among the cohorts exposed to the Quebec program, relative to their peers in other provinces. We illustrate graphically a monotonic increase in crime rates among cohorts with their exposure to the child care program, and we show in regression analysis that exposure led to a significant rise in overall crime rates. We also find that these effects are concentrated in boys, who also see the largest deterioration in non-cognitive skills. Our results reinforce previous research emphasizing the importance of non-cognitive development for later-life outcomes, and also provide an important input for the current debate over child care policy. The rapid growth in female labor force participation has led policy makers around the world to consider increased public entitlement to child care for two-worker families. Most recently, the Obama Administration unveiled an ambitious child care agenda, while the Mayor of New York has proposed universal pre-kindergarten availability.1 The 1 See https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/13/fact-sheet-president-obama-s-plan-earlyeducation-all-americans and http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/home/downloads/pdf/reports/2014/Ready-to-LaunchNYCs-Implementation-Plan-for-Free-High-Quality-Full-Day-Universal-Pre-Kindergarten.pdf 4 evidence presented here suggests that measurement of the near-term non-cognitive impact of these policy efforts can serve as a key indicator of the likely long-run success of failure of the program. Our paper also extends the record of North America’s best known experiment in universal preschool care and education. Universal programs like the one in Quebec, are more common in Europe. While the evaluation of their impacts is mixed (Dustmann et al. 2013, Felfe et al. 2015, Datta Gupta and Simonsen 2010, Havnes and Mogstad 2011), the external validity of the European evidence to other jurisdictions is not clear. European programs are run under different funding levels, which reflect the public’s greater acceptance of an active state and government’s assumption of a larger proportion of economic activity. The Quebec experience is important for understanding a universal initiative within the context of North American tax structures and labor market norms.

#### Gold-standard studies show troubling link between universal child care and non-cognitive outocmes

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A recent view of effects of previous child care exposure on outcomes in adolescence suggest that more hours in child care in general does not affect test scores, but has a negative effect on non-cognitive outcomes, such as impulsivity and risk-taking (Vandell et al., 2010). That study, typical of many in the literature, relies on parental choice of child care mode, raising the question of whether any estimated impacts of child care mode are causal or due to selection by parent type. Similar problems plague the large existing literature in economics on maternal work and child outcomes. A growing body of evidence comes from the use of experimental and quasiexperimental methods to examine the impacts of child care. Perhaps best known are programs targeted toward at-risk children; for example the experimental variation embedded in the evaluations of the Abecedarian and Perry Preschool interventions. These randomized trials from the 1960s have shown that high quality pre-school targeted to low-income children has substantial positive effects. For example, Heckman et al. (2010) estimate a statistically significant annual return of between 7 and 10 percent for the Perry Preschool intervention. Carneiro and Heckman (2003) summarize the evidence from these programs as improving motivation and social skills, while reducing crime and related behavior. Importantly for our 2 See a review of the literature up to 2008 in BGM, and in Baker (2011) and Cascio (2015). 6 work, Heckman et al. (2013) argue that the non-cognitive improvements were pivotal to the long-run impact on participant outcomes. Unlike the experimental evaluations of model programs, our paper focuses on a universal program that services a more economically and socially diverse group of children. In contrast to the literature on programs targeting at-risk children, the evidence on broader programs is mixed (see Baker 2011 and Cascio 2015 for recent overviews). In addition to the previous studies of the Quebec program, which are documented below, there have been evaluations of programs in Denmark, Norway, Spain and Germany. Exploiting variation in access to center-based preschool (versus a family-based alternative) in Denmark, Datta Gupta and Simonsen (2010) report little effect on non-cognitive outcomes at age 7, and a negative impact of family child care3 for boys of parents with low education. Black et al. (2014) utilize a discontinuity in the price of child care in Norway, reporting that while neither child care utilization or parental labor supply is sensitive to price, they observe a positive impact on children’s junior high school outcomes, presumably from a disposable income effect. Havnes and Mogstad (2011) explore an expansion of the Norwegian system, reporting positive impacts. The public system led to higher educational attainment (primarily for children of low education mothers) and earnings (mostly for girls) at ages 30–40. In a related paper Havnes and Mogstad (2014) provide more detail, finding that the earnings gains are primarily for children of low income parents and that children of upper class parents experience an earnings loss. Felfe et al. (2015) exploit variation across states in the expansion of 3 Family child care is in private homes, but the carergivers are employed by the local municipality. The municipality approves the facilities and the qualifications of the caregivers. 7 the Spanish child care system, finding improvements in reading skills at age 15 of 0.15 standard deviations, driven by the impacts for girls and children from disadvantaged families. Finally, Dustmann et al. (2013) explore a policy reform of the German child care system which entitles every child to a place on their third birthday. They find child care attendance has a positive impact on language and motor skill outcomes of children of immigrant ancestry but not on children of native ancestry. While there are clearly studies here that report positive impacts of universal children programs, in many cases these impacts are primarily enjoyed by less advantaged children. There is a little clear evidence that these programs provide significant benefits more broadly. Universal preschool has also been a focus of recent research in the United States. Many of these studies exploit age cutoffs for preschool enrollment comparing the youngest children in a preschool cohort to the children just a little bit younger who had to wait an additional year before enrolling. Perhaps the best known program is in Oklahoma. Gormley and Gayer (2005) document positive impacts for Hispanics and blacks, but not for whites, which is correlated with eligibility for free school lunch. Using a different cognitive measure Gormley et al. (2005) report more broadly based gains. A study of New Mexico’s program (Hustedt et al. 2008) finds positive effects on math achievement and literacy in a sample that over represents Hispanics and Native Americans. Taking a wider view, Wong et al. (2007) examine preschool programs in five states (a mix of targeted and universal programs) on a variety of outcomes. They record positive impacts on a little more than half of the outcomes investigated. Finally, Fitzpatrick (2008) studies the introduction of pre-K program in Georgia, finding positive impacts for disadvantaged children in small towns and rural areas. As with the European studies, the recent 8 American evidence mostly fits the pattern that the positive impact of universal programs is concentrated in more at-risk children. Most relevant to the current paper is research on the introduction of universal child care in Quebec. The initial evaluation of this policy in BGM found striking negative impacts of the program on child non-cognitive and family outcomes. In a series of papers Kottelenberg and Lehrer show that the most of these negative effects of the program on young children and family outcomes measured shortly after it was introduced have persisted as the program has matured (2013a), that the negative impacts on child outcomes are larger the younger the age the child entered the program (2014) and that the impacts vary by the sex of the child (2013b). Haeck et al. (2013) present evidence that the program had negative effects on children’s cognitive development at age 5. Finally, Brodeur and Connolly (2013) report that the Quebec program led to a small decrease in parent’s life satisfaction, although this was a result of large positive effects for low education parents being offset by negative effects for highly educated parents. To summarize, the literature on child care and preschool seems to indicate that highquality interventions for low-income populations deliver both short and long-run benefits. But broader child care expansions do not appear to provide short-term benefits, with mixed evidence on long-term effects.

Increase crime

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As noted above, we have two measures of criminality—rates of accused and convictions. We focus on four crimes (personal, property, other criminal code convictions and drugs), as well as an aggregate measure of the incidence of all of these crimes. To lay the foundation for this analysis, Figures 1 and 2 show cohort-specific age profiles of differences in the aggregate crime rates per 100,000 people between Quebec and the rest of Canada, in which the cohorts vary by their exposure to the Quebec program. For example, the bottom light dashed line in each graph shows the difference between the crime rate in Quebec and the crime rate in the rest of Canada, at each age, for those born before 1993. These children were not exposed to the child care program in Quebec. The light grey long dashed line shows the same differences for those born in 1993, who had one year of exposure (at age 4). The solid light grey line shows the differences for those born in 1994, who also had one year of exposure. The dark grey lines show the results for cohorts born between 1995 and 1997, who had two to three years of exposure. The final set of black lines at the top shows the results for cohorts born from 1998 to 2000, who had three to five years of exposure. The differences in the age profiles by cohort in these graphs are quite striking: there is a mostly monotonic decrease in the difference between the crime rates in Quebec and the rest of Canada with years of exposure to the Quebec program. That is, as cohorts in Quebec were more exposed to the program, their crime rates rose relative to the rest of Canada. This visual representation allows us to rule out the argument that this is just an aging effect: more exposed cohorts have higher differential crime rates at every age. It also allows us to rule out the idea that this is just a time series effect – at any year, crime rates are higher for 26 more exposed children (this can be seen by following the points diagonally – e.g. in 2010 those born in 1993 are 17 and have a much lower differential than those born in 1997, who are 13 at that year). This is striking evidence that exposure to this program is associated with higher levels of crime.

#### **This model is a disaster**

Bourne 19

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Some Democratic presidential candidates want to introduce government‐​funded, universal childcare programs. The stated rationale is usually the need for targeted financial help for families with children. But this reasoning is usually buttressed by a faith that government‐​funded care or preschool would improve the life chances of the children using it. Such assertions are based on extrapolating research findings from more limited programs targeted at those on low incomes, such as Head Start, the Perry Preschool Project and the Carolina Abecedarian Project. But assuming these results apply to more universal programs is fraught with danger. Wise heads, such as Nobel Prize winning economist James Heckman, have previously warned that: A much more careful analysis of the effects of scaling up the model programs to the target population, and its effects on costs, has to be undertaken before these estimates [of their impact] can be considered definitive. A new paper on the effects of the universal childcare program in Quebec (by economists Michael Baker, Jonathan Gruber, and Kevin Milligan) shows why Heckman was right to be cautious. The results are devastating for the case for universal care. On a sweep of evidence of universal programs around the world, the paper concludes that “there is a little clear evidence that these programs provide significant benefits more broadly,” than for some disadvantaged children. The results in Quebec were even worse. The government there introduced heavy subsidies for care for all children from ages zero through four in the 1990s, alongside regulations designed to improve “quality.” Maternal labor supply unsurprisingly rose, and child care services were used more heavily than in the rest of Canada. Disturbingly, though, “there was a large, significant, negative shock to the preschool, noncognitive development and health of children exposed to the new program, with little measured impact on cognitive skills.” This included “increases in early childhood anxiety and aggression.” Proponents of universal care usually say, to paraphrase, that “a good start in life is crucial to future wellbeing.” It stands to reason then that interventions that harm children can likewise have enduring scarring effects. When it comes to Quebec, this is exactly what the economists found. Though their results find “no consistent evidence of a lasting impact of the Quebec program on cognitive test scores,” the rest of their findings are extremely worrying: We do, however, find a significant decline in self‐​reported health and in life satisfaction among teens. Most strikingly, we find a sharp and contemporaneous increase in criminal behavior among the cohorts exposed to the Quebec program, relative to their peers in other provinces. We illustrate graphically a monotonic increase in crime rates among cohorts with their exposure to the child care program, and we show in regression analysis that exposure led to a significant rise in overall crime rates. We also report that these effects are primarily for boys, who also see the largest deterioration in noncognitive skills [the later includes aggression and hyperactivity]. The economists charitably conclude that their results confirm that early life interventions can have sustained impacts on life chances (implying the importance of doing childcare policy “right”). A more pessimistic reader would foresee potentially disastrous social consequences from adopting the sorts of universal programs that Democratic candidates are pushing.

Overall a bad system

McCloskey 19

Abby McCloskey, AEI researcher, Universal child care is the wrong approach, PUBLISHED BY National Review February 22, 2019, <https://www.aei.org/articles/universal-child-care-is-the-wrong-approach/)//LED>

Last week, Senator Elizabeth Warren (D., Mass.) unveiled her plan for universal child care. Families with income below 200 percent of the federal poverty line would pay nothing, while no family would spend more than 7 percent of its income on care. Her plan gives states flexibility to operate networks of center-based and home-based care, while imposing federal regulations to ensure quality. Like most working parents, we recognize the importance of having affordable and high-quality child care, both for the economic health of our families and for the development of our children. Unfortunately, Senator Warren’s recent proposal is likely to fall short of achieving these goals. There is no denying that child-care costs are a growing problem for families. Even conservative estimates suggest a 14 percent increase for the typical family since 1990, and many believe that American families need relief. Unaffordable child care can be a barrier to employment for parents who want to work, which harms their financial health and the growth and dynamism of the broader American economy. But universal child care is the wrong approach. First, just because something is expensive does not mean the government should subsidize it for everyone. Support should be targeted to families for whom the cost prohibits working or directly results in compromised quality of care. The more income-targeted the approach, the fewer unintended consequences that result and the less support to families that can pay for child care on their own. Second, and ironically, government efforts to address affordability would likely increase the costs of child care even further. As the economist Jeffrey Dorfman writes, “when government provides payments for anything, the cost of that good or service always rises.” This is because costs become distorted when providers have no incentive to increase productivity and compete for business. And increased costs do not always mean higher-quality care. Parents are less likely to hold providers accountable for quality when they pay little for it. Third, it is important to remember that we are not starting from scratch when it comes to helping families with child-care expenses. The proposal layers on top of the existing system of tax credits and block grants to states. In the existing system, families with children can potentially receive support for childcare from the earned-income tax credit (EITC), the child tax credit (CTC), and the child-and-dependent-care tax credit. Of these, the EITC is the best targeted at the lowest-income households, while the CTC is only partly refundable (meaning it goes to people without federal income-tax liability) and the dependent-care credit is not refundable at all, making both less accessible for those most in need. In addition, states can help eligible children with child-care subsidies through the Child Care Development Block Grant (CCDBG). However, only about 12 to 15 percent of federally eligible children are in fact served. Rather than a universal child-care program, a useful starting point could be expansion of this existing system. Fourth, the proposal does not sufficiently address child-care quality. No evidence suggests that the government can sufficiently ensure quality child care under a universal system. A similar Canadian experiment showed that universal child care in Quebec resulted in children being “worse off in a variety of behavioral and health dimensions, ranging from aggression to motor-social skills to illness” than children without access to universal care. Heavily regulating child care likely results in some high-quality providers, but it risks driving other providers out of the market because the added costs make the business unprofitable. States have already learned this lesson through declines in home-based providers as part of the CCDBG subsidy program (increased requirements were added to the program in 2014). And finally, this carries a $700 billion price tag over ten years, on top of numerous other Democratic priorities including free college, guaranteed jobs, and the Green New Deal. One is left wondering where the prioritization of spending will end up. We believe that there’s no shortage of ways to target child-care assistance to those who need it most without the unintended consequences of a universal system. Reasonable investments could make the dependent-care and child tax credits fully refundable for low- and middle-income families. The dependent-care credit could be indexed to inflation in child-care costs, and it could be provided monthly or quarterly to allow working parents the ability to secure child care. The EITC could be expanded to help families better meet child-care costs as well. One benefit of refundable tax credits for low-income families is that they remain market-based. Parents would be able to choose which providers or centers they would like to put their kids in, increasing the demand for high-quality care, while at the same time giving families a stake in the costs. An added advantage could be reduced need for government subsidies through the CCDBG, if families were helped directly through tax credits. We welcome a conversation on this important issue. But a universal program is likely to create more problems than it solves. A system that better targets the most vulnerable, reforms existing programs, and addresses the quality of care, at a reasonable cost, is more likely to benefit American parents and children.

### Extension

#### Our studies are incredibly thorough and simply the best

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We make use of four types of data (consisting of six data sets) for our analysis to trace the long-run impact of the Quebec program from the period of treatment through to young adulthood, covering a variety of relevant outcomes. For all the data sources, our sample selection decisions are guided by how each source covered the cohorts exposed to program treatment. Below we describe each of the four data sources in turn. Child Care Enrollment and Child Outcomes: NLSCY Our first dataset is the National Longitudinal Study of Children and Youth (NLSCY), which was the primary dataset in BGM. The NLSCY is a nationally representative survey of children, conducted biannually between 1994-95 (cycle 1) and 2008-09 (cycle 8). A cohort of about 2000 children for each age between 0 and 11 was selected in the initial cycle and followed 11 throughout the entire survey. In subsequent waves new cohorts of 0-1 year olds were added but generally only followed until age 5. Therefore, in each wave the survey offers data on the first wave cohort, as well as children aged 0-5. We use the NLSCY for two purposes, each with a different sample. First, we re-examine the contemporaneous impact of the Quebec Family Plan on some child outcomes. For this, we take a sample of children aged 0 to 4 from cycles 1 through 5 (excluding the transitional cycle 3, as in BGM). Second, we want to see if the estimated contemporaneous impacts persist into grade school. To do this, we take a sample of 5 to 9 year olds in cycles 1 and 2 (the ‘pre’ period) and compare them to 5 to 9 year olds in cycle 7. We restrict the sample to cycle 7 to ensure we have the same set of ages for the treatment and control groups.5 We focus on a number of outcome measures. First is a binary indicator for the child being in any type of non-parental care while the parent works or is at school. Next is a set of parent reported non-cognitive scores. At ages 2 and 3 we observe indices of Hyperactivity, Anxiety, Separation Anxiety, and Aggression, which are described in detail in BGM.6 For the 5-9 year olds we have indices of Hyperactivity, Anxiety, Aggression, Indirect Aggression and Prosocial Behaviour. While some of indices for the older age group have the same names as corresponding indices for the younger children, they are based on a different set of age 5 Cycle 7 is the only one with children at each age between 5 and 9 who are treated. The other cycles have holes at some ages. We have also run our results using all cycle 4 to cycle 8 observations within the age 5 to 9 range and the results are similar. We view the restricted sample we use for our main results as the more conservative approach. 6 For the non-cognitive outcomes we focus on 2-3 year olds (as in BGM) within the 0-4 age group, because the measures do not exist for children ages 0-1 and as noted, the non-cognitive indices for 4 year olds are based on different questions. 12 appropriate questions.7 We also investigate a parent report of how the child gets along at school with his/her teacher. Finally, we examine the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT) score as a measure of cognitive development. Test Scores: SAIP/PCAP and PISA To measure the impact of the Quebec program on test scores of older children, we turn to two different data sets. The first data set combines data from the School Achievement Indicators Program (SAIP) and subsequent Pan Canadian Assessment Program (PCAP), which are initiatives of the Council of Ministers of Education. The SAIP initiated in 1993 is a set of standardized tests to assess the performance of 13 and 16 year old students across the country, in the core subjects of math, reading and science. The tests were conducted 9 times between 1993 and 2004, each time focusing on one of the core subjects. The PCAP succeeded the SAIP, and has been conducted triennially starting in 2007. Like SAIP, one of math, reading or science is the focus of each PCAP. Unlike SAIP, a smaller sample of students writes tests in the other non-focal subjects. This means that scores for each subject are available in each PCAP wave. We pool data from SAIP and PCAP to construct analysis samples for each subject area. Each subject sample contains data from the 2007 and 2010 PCAPs, while the math sample adds SAIP data from 1997 and 2001, the reading sample adds SAIP data from 1998 and the science sample adds SAIP data from 1996. 7 The age range for the scores for younger children is 2-3, while a different set of questions is used to form the scores for children from age 4 up. 13 The second data set comes from the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), which is a triennial test of 15 year olds conducted by the OECD in countries around the world. This testing program was initiated in 2000, and is conducted in the core subject areas of math, reading and science. Because the test is conducted in many countries it is not tailored to the curriculum of a particular school system. Our analysis sample includes the Canadian test scores from 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009 and 2012. Health and Well-Being: CCHS and CHMS To assess the impact of the child care intervention on the health of older children, we use two further data sets. The first is the Canadian Community Health Survey (CCHS). The CCHS offers biannual data for 2001, 2003, and 2005 of approximately 130,000 observations; followed by annual surveys of around 65,000 observations starting in 2007. We use all available surveys—the latest data is for 2013. The sampling coverage of the survey is national, with a range of questions on individual health behaviors and outcomes. We use questions on selfassessed health, life satisfaction, and mental health. We examine a sample of 12 through 20 year olds, which in the chosen years contains both individuals who were and were not exposed to the child care program at younger ages. The second is the Canadian Health Measures Survey (CHMS), which started in 2007, with data from 3 cycles—2007-2009, 2009-2011, 2012-2013—now available. This survey combines information on health behaviors with a set of direct physical measurements. It is stratified— collected only in 16 sites—but with weights, the sample of around 5,700 can recover nationallyrepresentative estimates. We select a sample of youth ages 15-20, which again contains both 14 individuals who were and were not exposed to the child care program at younger ages.8 We examine self-reported measures of health, ranging from general health to stress to mental health and life satisfaction. Criminal Behavior: UCRS We combine special tabulations of crime accusations9 and convictions from Statistics Canada’s Uniform Crime Reporting Survey (UCRS) with single age population counts to construct crime rates by age, sex, province, year cells. The UCRS is a survey of police reported crime.10 This means that the crime incident has been substantiated by the police and therefore the survey misses crimes that are never detected and/or not reported to the police. We examine rates (separately) for crimes against persons and property (separately), “other criminal code violations” and drug violations, as well as an aggregate crime rate based on these four categories.11 For our age groups most “other criminal code violations” involve failures to appear in court and breaches of probation.12 8 The CHMS surveys individuals aged 3-79, but all Quebec children younger than 15 were exposed to the child care program in the survey years available. 9 The accused includes those charged plus those dealt with through the use of extrajudicial measures. 10 Responding to the coverage is mandatory and survey compliance is reported as “virtually 100 percent” (http://www23.statcan.gc.ca/imdb/p2SV.pl?Function=getSurvey&SDDS=3302). 11 We omit the traffic crime category as in most provinces the legal driving age is 16, and there are graduated licensing schemes that impose significant restrictions on older teenaged drivers. 12 Other prevalent youth crimes are theft under $5000, assault, mischief, breaking and entering, cannabis possession, uttering threats and possession of stolen property. There is also a residual category for ‘other federal statute violations’, that includes violations under legislation such as the Bankruptcy Act and the Competition Act. See Zhang (2014) for a recent comparison of youth and adult crime rates by offence. 15 Our data is for the years 2006 through the latest available, 2013. Our choice to start the analysis in 2006 is, as explained below, made to stay clear of any impact of the introduction of the Youth Criminal Justice Act in 2003. As in our analysis of the CCHS, we construct our sample for 12 through 20 year olds. Empirical Strategy For all but the crime analysis, the empirical strategy is a straightforward difference-indifference analysis that follows BGM. This empirical framework compares the pre and post program outcomes of children/teenagers in Quebec, to the corresponding outcomes of child/teenagers in the rest of Canada. We estimate models of the form: (1) Yipt = α + βEXPOSUREpt + πPROVp + δYEARt + λXipt + εipt where i indexes individual children, p indexes province, and t indexes year in the survey. We control for a set of province dummies (PROVp) and year dummies (YEARt ), as well as control variables that vary (according to availability) by data set but can include gender, child’s age, mother’s age and education, the number of older and younger siblings, urban status and mother’s/father’s/family’s immigrant status and ethnicity. The full set of explanatory variables by data set is reported in a table in the appendix. We focus on the estimation of β, the coefficient on exposure to the Quebec child care program. Standard errors are clustered by province by birth-year cohort. For the crime analysis, we have data that covers a larger number of cohorts over a larger number of years. This allows us to estimate a more flexible version of equation (1) in which we 16 introduce a full set of province/(own) age/gender interactions as well as province specific time effects. Scaling Reduced Form Results As discussed in BGM, our modeling of outcomes is a reduced form of an underlying process through which the Quebec policy impacts maternal labor supply and child care utilization. To interpret the results structurally, in that paper we either scaled the estimated effects by the impact of the Quebec policy on maternal labor supply (a 7% rise) or by its impact on use of child care (a 14% rise). But we also noted that the effects could be even broader as the program led to a large shift in the locus of child care as well. Haeck et al. (2013) show that between the mid-1990s and 2008 the proportion of children, aged 1-4, who were in centerbased care as their primary arrangement rose in Quebec from under 10 percent to close to 60 percent, while in the rest of Canada it rose from about 10 percent to just under 20 percent. The proportion in parental care fell from around 55 percent to roughly 25 percent in Quebec over this same period, while the similar proportion in the rest of the country fell from just under 60 percent to about 50 percent, where it has stabilized since 1998. By this metric the proportion of treated children in Quebec is much higher than the proportion who moved into non parental care with the advent of the program. There are therefore a wide variety of “first stage” estimates one could apply to the longer run reduced form impacts we estimate here. As a result, we are reticent here to interpret any of our longer run results in a structural way, and focus instead on the sign and significance of our reduced form findings. 17 Additional Factors In our previous study of the Quebec program we limited our analysis sample to children in two parent families. This was to minimize any possible confounding effects of concurrent changes to Canada’s National Child Benefit on our sample of 0-4 year olds. Due to income testing, this program benefits single parent households disproportionately. As noted in Baker and Milligan (2010) roughly 90 percent of children are born into two parent families in Canada, so this restriction is not as limiting as it might be in other countries. As we turn our focus to children at older ages, the restriction to children in two parent families makes less sense. Due to family dynamics, at older ages children currently living in single parent families may have lived in two parent families when they were young. Likewise, children currently in two parent families may have been born into single parent households. We therefore sample children in all family types. BGM report a limited set of results demonstrating that the main findings of the study extend to the children of single-parent households. We extend this point below in our reexamination of the contemporaneous impacts of the program on the outcomes of young children from all families. Milligan and Stabile (2011) report evidence that indicates the changes to child benefits had positive impacts on child development. Therefore, any bias from including children from single parent families in our sample will attenuate many of the impacts of the Quebec Family Plan we report.13

#### **Study concludes that this model decreases health, increases crime, and significantly worsens outcomes**

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In this section we model the impact of exposure to the Quebec Family Plan on noncognitive skills of youths. We begin by replicating earlier analysis showing the negative effects on non-cognitive skills of young children. We then extend the results to show that the estimated deficits persist once these children enter school. In Table 1 we report the impact of the Quebec program on selected outcomes of young children. This table is different from the analysis in BGM because we now include children of both single-parent and two-parent families. In the first row is the estimate of the effect of the Quebec program on the probability of the child being enrolled in child care at ages zero through four. At just over 15 percentage points, this result is marginally larger than the estimate in our previous paper (0.146). However, it leads to the same conclusion that the effect of the program is to increase child care use by a little more than one-third of the baseline rate. In the next four rows are the estimates of the impact of the program on non-cognitive outcomes at ages 2 and 3. Note that in each case a higher score indicates a poorer outcome. The estimates echo the results in BGM in terms of statistical significance—statistically significant estimates for Anxiety and Aggression but not for Hyperactivity and Separation Anxiety. They are marginally larger in magnitude than the estimates in our previous paper, although not enough to qualitatively change our inference. At 10 percent and 13 percent of a standard deviation respectively, the inference for Anxiety and Aggression match well with the conclusions in BGM.15 In the last row is the estimated impact of the program on a measure of cognitive development—PPVT—at ages 4 and 5. It is almost 1.7 points, or 11 percent of a standard deviation and is statistically significant at conventional levels. This result, while consistent with 15 In BGM the estimates for Anxiety and Aggression are 9 percent and 12 percent of a standard deviation, respectively. 20 Haeck et al. (2013), is not consistent with the estimate in BGM. The estimate in BGM was for the sample of 4 year olds, and the addition of five years olds here explains the difference. When we restrict the sample to 4 year olds we obtain an insignificant estimate of -0.250 (0.843), consistent with the insignificant result (0.36 with standard error of 0.75) in BGM. The results in table 1 demonstrate that the main conclusions of BGM for young children of two parent families extend to the full sample of young children from all family types. The Quebec program led to a substantial increase in the use of child care and increases in children’s levels of anxiety and aggression. One difference between the results here and in BGM is the small negative impact on children’s cognitive development as measured by the PPVT, although that distinction is driven by the age group used for the sample. The Impact of the Quebec Child Care program on the Outcomes of Children aged 5-9 Years Old We next extend the analysis in table 1 to children of older ages. As noted above, the questions about behavior in the NLSCY are different for ages 4-11 than for ages 2-3. This means that for older children, we have two new indices for Prosocial behavior and Indirect Aggression, and that the indices for Hyperactivity, Anxiety and Aggression, while similar in name to the indices in table 1, are based on a different set of age-appropriate questions. The index of Prosocial behavior is coded so that a higher score indicates a poorer outcome. The results presented in the first 5 rows of table 2 show that the Quebec program’s negative effects on non-cognitive skills appear to strongly persist into school years, and in many instances are larger than at younger ages. For Anxiety the impact is now just over one quarter of a standard deviation, which is more than twice as large as for 2-3 year olds, while for 21 Aggression it is now just under one fifth of a standard deviation, or roughly 50 percent higher than at younger ages. New here is a statistically significant impact on Hyperactivity of almost 10 percent of a standard deviation. For the two new indices we see a statistically significant impact on Indirect Aggression of 16 percent of a standard deviation, and while the result for Prosocial behavior indicates a poorer outcome in sign, it is not statistically significant. For the older children we also have an alternative measure of behavior, a parentreported indication of how the child gets along with his/her teacher at school. The variable is coded 0/1, where one indicates the child gets along very well with his/her teacher (there are no problems). The estimate for this variable is in the last row of table 2. It is consistent with the results for the non-cognitive indices, in that it indicates exposure to the Quebec program leads to a statistically significant worse outcome. Taken together, the negative impact of the Quebec program on the non-cognitive outcomes of young children appears to persist and grow as they reach school ages. Unfortunately, there is no parallel cognitive measure available in the NLSCY at older ages to follow up on the PPVT result in table 1.16 Instead we examine cognitive test scores at older ages available from SAIP/PCAP and PISA. 16 While school aged children in the NLSCY did complete a standardized test in math, there were problems with its delivery in waves 1-3. First, in the initial wave of the survey, a ceiling effect—a disproportionate number of perfect scores—was detected. This ceiling effect was particularly pronounced for the province of Quebec, and it persisted in the second wave of data (see documentation of these problems with the math test in the NLSCY microdata user guides for Cycle 1, Cycle 2, and Cycle 3). Second, the response rate to the math test was low and variable in the first waves of the survey. For example, just over 50 percent in wave 1 completed the math test. This response rate increased to 74 percent in wave 2, and then fell back down to 54 percent in wave 3. Since these waves wholly constitute the pre-program data available in the NLSCY, we do not include the math scores in the analysis. 22 Part V: Impacts on Teen Outcomes Having established that the Quebec program negatively affected non-cognitive outcomes, and that this effect persisted into the school years, we next examine teen outcomes along several dimensions. We look first at cognitive outcomes using standardized test scores. This is followed by estimates for self reports of health and life satisfaction. Finally, we look for any impact of the Quebec child care program on youth crime. Cognitive Outcomes As noted above we are unable to follow any impact of the Quebec program on cognitive outcomes at older ages in the NLSCY due to issues with the standardized math tests in the first waves. Instead we use data from periodic standardized testing of Canadian teens through SAIP/PCAP and PISA. Note that the 2009 PISA scores are likely to capture both teenagers in Quebec who were and were not exposed to the child care program. We consider different coding of the EXPOSURE dummy for the 2009 scores to discover how the estimates vary on this margin. The estimates are presented in table 3. The standard deviations of the scores are approximately one so the point estimates can be read directly as proportions of a standard deviation. In the first row are the results for the PCAP/SAIP tests. The estimates indicate a marginally significant, negative impact of exposure to the Quebec program on math scores of over 20 percent of a standard deviation, and statistically insignificant, small, negative impacts on reading and science scores. 23 In the next two rows are the results for the PISA tests alternatively viewing the 2009 scores as capturing Quebec children who are not or who are exposed to the child care program. If we view the 2009 scores as pre-program, we obtain a marginally significant positive impact of exposure in math of almost 12 percent of a standard deviation and an almost equal marginally significant negative impact in science. The impact on reading is positive, statistically insignificant and very small. If instead we view the 2009 scores as post program, the impact on math is still positive but larger and significant at the 1 percent level and one quarter of a standard deviation, while the impact for reading and science are both statistically insignificant and very small. On balance the results in table 3 do not provide strong evidence of a persistent negative impact of the Quebec program on cognitive ability, as first evidenced on table 1 in PPVT scores. The least precise inference is for math scores. The estimates show exposure to the Quebec program leading to over a 20 percent standard deviation increase or decrease in scores. The inference for science and reading scores is a more consistent story of no impact of the Quebec program. Overall there is no strong evidence in these estimates that the Quebec Family Plan had a lasting impact on children’s cognitive development. Health and Life Satisfaction We next study the impact of exposure to the Quebec program on health status and on life satisfaction using the CCHS and CMHS surveys. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 4. For the CCHS, we show the results for ages 12-20, while in the CHMS we use a sample of 15-20 year olds. All health measures are coded so a higher score indicates a worse outcome. 24 The point estimates from each survey mostly indicate that exposure to the Quebec program is associated with some worsening of self-reported health. For youths exposed to the program, the health indicator rises in both surveys. The increase in the CCHS is 7.2 percent of a standard deviation. The rise is a much larger in the CMHS but the standard error is larger as well so that the estimate is not significant. The estimate for life satisfaction is small and statistically insignificant in the CCHS, but indicates a statistically significant poorer outcome in the CMHS; the effect is large, amounting to more than one-third of a standard deviation. There are no significant effects on mental health or stress, but quality of life measure also worsens significantly in the CHMS, once again by more than a third of a standard deviation. Overall, these results give strong indications of a worsening of both health and life satisfaction among those older youths exposed to the Quebec child care program. Youth Crime Our final measure of longer-run outcomes is youth criminal activity. In evaluations of the Perry Preschool program, the long-run impact on crime was a vital component of the analysis.17 Our aim here is to investigate whether the link between non-cognitive development and crime holds up in a symmetric case where there is a decrease in measured non-cognitive development.

Increase crime

Baker et al 15

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As noted above, we have two measures of criminality—rates of accused and convictions. We focus on four crimes (personal, property, other criminal code convictions and drugs), as well as an aggregate measure of the incidence of all of these crimes. To lay the foundation for this analysis, Figures 1 and 2 show cohort-specific age profiles of differences in the aggregate crime rates per 100,000 people between Quebec and the rest of Canada, in which the cohorts vary by their exposure to the Quebec program. For example, the bottom light dashed line in each graph shows the difference between the crime rate in Quebec and the crime rate in the rest of Canada, at each age, for those born before 1993. These children were not exposed to the child care program in Quebec. The light grey long dashed line shows the same differences for those born in 1993, who had one year of exposure (at age 4). The solid light grey line shows the differences for those born in 1994, who also had one year of exposure. The dark grey lines show the results for cohorts born between 1995 and 1997, who had two to three years of exposure. The final set of black lines at the top shows the results for cohorts born from 1998 to 2000, who had three to five years of exposure. The differences in the age profiles by cohort in these graphs are quite striking: there is a mostly monotonic decrease in the difference between the crime rates in Quebec and the rest of Canada with years of exposure to the Quebec program. That is, as cohorts in Quebec were more exposed to the program, their crime rates rose relative to the rest of Canada. This visual representation allows us to rule out the argument that this is just an aging effect: more exposed cohorts have higher differential crime rates at every age. It also allows us to rule out the idea that this is just a time series effect – at any year, crime rates are higher for 26 more exposed children (this can be seen by following the points diagonally – e.g. in 2010 those born in 1993 are 17 and have a much lower differential than those born in 1997, who are 13 at that year). This is striking evidence that exposure to this program is associated with higher levels of crime.